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Introduction and study aims
The new Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) was introduced in NHSScotland
in October 2001 and used in the annual NHS Board Accountability Reviews in 2002
and 2003. The PAF was assigned three objectives outlined in Our National Health:
(1) ‘Support and encourage sustained improvement in the performance of NHS
Scotland by focussing on key measures in relation to health priorities.’
(2) ‘Reinforce and support the role of the 15 NHS Boards in managing the
performance of their local NHS systems.’
(3) ‘Enable NHS Scotland to account systematically for its performance both
locally and through the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Parliament and to
the people of Scotland.’
The success with which the PAF appears to be meeting those objectives forms the
focus of this investigation. A key element determining how and whether the PAF
affects the behaviour of decision-makers within the organisations and subsequently
NHS Scotland performance is the perception of the PAF and the signals it generates.
Thus it is important to determine what these perceptions and understandings are. It is
necessary to capture these views in order to appreciate fully the impact of the PAF
within the NHS in Scotland and to appraise its salience and power as a performance
tool.
Methods
Three groups of stakeholders were interviewed: from NHS Boards, organisations
within Boards and from the Scottish Executive Health Department. The same ‘core’
interview schedule was used for each group. This study covers the results for the first
two groups. Each NHS Board was represented in the initial sample by an interview
with every Board Chief Executive and a further five Boards were selected as depth
case study sites where interviews were conducted with a wider range of staff. The five
case study sites were chosen to provide a sample that reflected both the range of
Health Board 'types' in Scotland and geographical spread. The study used a semi-
structured interview schedule based around a series of questions relating to the
development and implementation of the PAF, the Accountability Review, the choice
of indicators, and the incentives in the system relating to the PAF. Fifty-four
interviews were undertaken. All interviews were audio-tape recorded, transcribed, and
anonymised prior to analysis by the research team.
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Key findings and implications
1. General acceptability of performance assessment frameworks
Findings
• There was support for the use of performance assessment generally in the
public sector.
• Support for the Scottish PAF per se was strengthened by the absence of league
tables and its importance as a stimulus for discussion at the Accountability
Reviews.
Implications
• In order to retain the high commitment of NHS Scotland, it is important to
avoid the pitfalls of other similar systems, such as league tables and strong
financial incentives.
2. The indicators
Findings
• Responses were mixed with respect to the scope and sensitivity of the
indicators. Overall support was voiced but with clear reservations around some
areas.
• General concern was raised with respect to the overload from the data
collection and assessments and the risk that PAF might become an end in itself.
• There were differing views as to whether all indicators required improvement
or were there to provide context against which other indicators can be viewed.
• Evidence of tension between the weights given to waiting times and financial
performance indicators and those relating to health and equity emerged from
the data. The challenge of capturing qualitative data was raised repeatedly and
the PAF bias toward measuring only those aspects that could be easily
enumerated.
Implications
• Refinement should continue to be undertaken in consultation with the NHS.
Focus should be on improving what is currently there without adding to its
volume.
• Greater clarity is required as to why some indicators are included in the PAF
especially those relating to health and inequality and the differences in weight
attached to the indicators should be made explicit.
3. Accountability, motivation and managerial performance
Findings
• The integration of the PAF into the Accountability Reviews and the
transparency and inclusiveness of that process and dialogue was welcomed.
• All levels of staff interviewed felt that a key reward was the self-knowledge
and external acknowledgement that they were helping to provide a good health
service.
• There are no explicit incentives or rewards for the Boards associated with doing
well on the PAF.
• The vulnerability of the Chief Executive posts is seen as an incentive to
perform well on the PAF.
• Some Boards linked the PAF with performance related pay (PRP). The role of
PRP as a means of recognition of good work appeared to be as important as the
financial incentive per se.
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• The Accountability Review letter was a key mechanism of feed back and
recognition of good work and was valued by the NHS Boards.
Implications
• The climate of trust and open dialogue should be preserved.
• If rewards are attached to good performance, they should be designed with
regard to the symbolism as well as any financial aspect.
4. PAF and leadership
Findings
• Different models of implementation are employed throughout Scotland and
there seems to be no one single model for success though clear local as well as
national leadership was important.
• NHS Boards which integrate the PAF into their management systems appear to
find the process less burdensome.
• The respondents linked strong and effective leadership to effective
implementation of the PAF.
Implications
• Mechanisms for the dissemination of good practice should be introduced.
5. Local and national accountability
Findings
• The current presentation of the data was reported as overly complex and
inaccessible for the public (and indeed, some professionals) and the contextual
information required for interpretation of the data is not available.
• The type of measures included in the PAF may not be meaningful or
appropriate to public’s needs.
• The PAF meets its objective of local accountability in a limited way and
indirectly through the publication of the NHS Board’s Accountability Review
letters.
Implications
• The local accountability objective needs to be re-examined in terms of its
laudability and, if this is confirmed, new means need to be established to
increase local accountability.
Future research agenda
The limits of this study are governed by the time-scale in which it has been
undertaken and while it answers a number of interesting questions it raises many new
and related questions. Some are very closely related to the study described in this
report and would build on the analysis using the existing data set. Other areas of
suggested future research are quite distinct from the questions and methods used here.
There are opportunities for illuminating and improving the Scottish system through
comparison with other similar systems. Of key importance is what factors influence
performance. This question can be tackled using qualitative and quantitative methods.
Over time, quantitative methods will become more instrumental as longitudinal data
sets become available.
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11. Introduction and aims
The new Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) and accountability
arrangements for Scotland were announced in Our National Health1 and given more
detail in Rebuilding our National Health Service2 and the consultation document
New performance assessment and accountability review arrangements for
NHSScotland3. The framework was introduced in NHSScotland in October 2001 and
used in the annual NHS Board Accountability Reviews in 2002 and 2003.
The PAF was assigned three objectives outlined in Our National Health. These are:
Objective 1. ‘Support and encourage sustained improvement in the performance of
NHS Scotland by focussing on key measures in relation to health priorities.’
Objective 2. ‘Reinforce and support the role of the 15 NHS Boards in managing the
performance of their local NHS systems.’
Objective 3. ‘Enable NHS Scotland to account systematically for its performance both
locally and through the Scottish Executive to the Scottish Parliament and to the
people of Scotland.’
In accordance with the Scottish Executive Invitation to Tender 2002/04, the success
with which the PAF appears to be meeting those objectives forms the focus of this
investigation. Each of these objectives raises a number of questions and issues that,
when combined with the issues raised in the literature, will form the basis of our
investigation. In order to identify the requirements from the research remit, it is
necessary to focus initially on what is meant by each of these objectives. Each
objective is discussed below.
Objective 1. ‘Support and encourage sustained improvement in the performance of
NHS Scotland by focussing on key measures in relation to health priorities.’
In order for the PAF to work well, these individual indicators need to be accurate
representations of the required outputs and outcomes. More broadly, the indicators
must encapsulate the essence of a high performing NHS. A wide array of performance
indicators has been included in the PAF under seven main headings.
Little systematic data exists about how key managers and clinicians perceive the
implementation of PAF and it is timely to gather these insights at this stage in its
operation. The aim here is to elicit views on the sensitivity and scope of indicators. It
is not be our intention to examine each indicator individually but to gain a general
impression and to note where particular concerns are highlighted with respect to
specific indicators. The emphasis on a qualitative approach is important as it provides
an opportunity to give voice to the key stakeholders who shape PAF locally. The aim
here is not to judge objective improvement performance outcomes but rather to
emphasise accounts and perceptions of the improvement process.
At the moment there are no explicit weights attached to indicators, which implies that
they are all of equal importance. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Scottish
Executive may place greater weight on waiting time and financial targets, but Boards
and their constituent parts may place more importance on other dimensions of
2performance that are perceived to be relevant locally. If the PAF is to work well in
guiding the service providers towards improved performance then the signals they
receive need to be a clear representation of what the policy-makers are trying to
achieve.
The ‘support and encourage’ element of the first objective of the PAF is crucial to its
success. How does the PAF ‘support and encourage’ improved performance? The use
of the PAF as part of each NHS Board’s Accountability Review perhaps gives
substance to the system by integrating the indicators into the management structure of
NHS Scotland. What is the nature of this support and encouragement? An important
issue here is the mechanisms that are being used to ‘encourage sustained improvement
in performance’. Although, currently, there are no explicit incentives attached to the
PAF, there may be implicit rewards and penalties in terms of access to central
funding, autonomy, serving on Scotland-wide committees and reviews, and linking
executive pay to organisational performance.4 The effect of the labour market for
managers may also provide incentives to meet performance targets with career
mobility and promotion directly or indirectly linked to PAF successes.5  Each of these
will be examined from the perspective of the stakeholders and other possible
mechanisms that affect behaviour will be identified.
Objective 2. ‘Reinforce and support the role of the 15 NHS Boards in managing the
performance of their local NHS systems.’
What is the role of the PAF in monitoring and accounting for performance within
NHS Boards? The PAF and Accountability Reviews operate at NHS Board level and
performance assessment below Board level is the responsibility of the Board. The
Unified NHS Board structure is further vertically integrating the NHS organisations
within each Board. This will internalise the operational management role of NHS
Trusts into Operating Divisions of the NHS Boards6.
The Board has responsibility to respond to the objectives of the Scottish Executive
whilst ensuring that the next line in the hierarchy, the service providers, responds to
its own objectives. Of key importance in the successful operation of the PAF is the
effectiveness of this line of responsibility, accountability and reward. Continuing the
theme of the first objective, what mechanisms do the Boards have at their disposal to
support and encourage improved performance? Does the PAF provide them with such
a mechanism, and how does it operate?
Objective 3. ‘Enable NHS Scotland to account systematically for its performance both
locally and through the SE to the Scottish Parliament and to the people of Scotland.’
This raises questions about whether and how the PAF is being used to provide greater
accountability. Does the PAF adequately represent the views and concerns of the
public and Parliament and is the information available and accessible and in a form
understandable by the health service users and public generally?
Turning now to the research approach used in this study, a key element determining
how and whether the PAF affects the behaviour of decision-makers within the
organisations and subsequently NHS Scotland performance is the perception of the
PAF and the signals it generates. As suggested above, the way in which NHS
organisations respond will be determined by how they perceive the PAF and its
objectives. Thus it is important to determine what these perceptions and
3understandings are. It is necessary to capture these views in order to appreciate fully
the impact of the PAF within the NHS in Scotland and to appraise its salience and
power as a performance tool.
In section two, background detail to the report is given. The next section presents the
methods used to collect and analyse the data and considers the strengths and
weaknesses of the methodology. The main findings from the interviews are presented
in section four. The presentation of this section follows the structure of the interview
schedule used in the data collection. Section five discusses the key findings under the
headings of the three PAF objectives. Section six presents a list of policy implications
and the last section considers areas of possible future research raised by this study.
42. Background
Scotland is far from alone in designing a Performance Assessment Framework to
monitor and improve the performance of its health care system. Other governments
around the world have introduced similar instruments, notably, in England but also in
the USA and Canada. Their use is also apparent in other sectors in the UK through
school league tables7 and through the introduction of the Comprehensive Performance
Assessment of Local Authorities in England8. The variety of settings in which
performance assessment frameworks are used is indicative of the fact that they are not
necessarily synonymous with a centrally planned health care system. A PAF is
essentially a form of information and regulation which can be used within a market or
non-market-based sector9.
As one would expect given this variation in system setting, the production of such
performance information is associated with a number of possible objectives:10
1. To secure or enhance accountability to funders and other stakeholders.
2. To identify areas of poor or under-performance and centres of excellence.
3. To help patients and purchasers of health care choose a provider.
4. To enable providers to focus on areas requiring improvement.
5. To provide epidemiological and other public data.
The Scottish PAF has all of these at the heart of its objectives with the exception of
the third, which is more applicable to market-orientated system health care systems
such as those of England and the USA. The Scottish system is also distinguishable
from other systems by the lack of explicit financial or non-financial rewards and
penalties attached to the performance assessment frameworka and the absence of
published performance league tables.
The Scottish system is based on an annual production and assessment of data. The
seven areas of performance covered by the data are
1. Health improvement and reducing inequalities
2. Fair access to health care services
3. Clinical governance and effectiveness of healthcare
4. Patients’ experience, including service quality
5. Involving public and communities
6. Staff governance
7. Organisational and financial performance and efficiency
The Information and Statistics Division of the Scottish Executive provide the 15 NHS
Boards with their own PAF data in February of each year. The data can be divided
into quantitative data and qualitative data in the form of assessments. The quantitative
data is presented showing comparisons with previous years and with other NHS
Boards. Boards then have an opportunity to review and discuss this information prior
to an updated version of the data being published at the end of May. The data are used
to inform the NHS Board Accountability Reviews, which take place for each Board
during the following June and July11.
                                                          
a At the time of writing, a proposal to attach such incentives to the PAF is under consultation.
5Despite the proliferation of performance assessment frameworks, there has been
limited empirical evaluation of the effects of the introduction of such systems at the
whole system level and our study attempts to address this deficit.
63. Methods
3.1 Data collection and analysis
In line with our aim of gathering rich insights from PAF ‘implementers’, three groups
of stakeholders were interviewed: from NHS Boards, NHS organisations within
Boards and from the Scottish Executive Health Department (SEHD). The same ‘core’
interview schedule was used for each group of stakeholders, to allow perceptions and
key themes to be compared and contrasted. This study covers the results for the first
two groups. The Scottish Executive interviews are used within this report as
contextual data and for clarification purposes only.
The final scope of the interview sample and study approach was decided in
consultation with the PAF Project Management Team at the SEHD. As in any
qualitative study there is a trade-off between the scope and the depth of the analysis,
in terms of the coverage of all NHS Boards versus the number of interviews to hold in
each. The timescale was also a critical factor affecting scale of the project and overall
sample size. Each NHS Board was represented in the initial sample by an interview
with every Board Chief Executive and a further five Boards were selected as depth
case study sites where interviews were conducted with a wider range of staff. In
addition, interviews were conducted within the SEHD with key individuals who are
primarily involved in the development of policy and the implementation of the PAF.
The five case study sites were chosen to provide a sample that reflected both the range
of Health Board 'types' in Scotland and geographical spread. Criteria used in selection
considered factors such as socio-economic status, 'remoteness' and 'rurality',
population size, geographical size and geographical location within Scotland. The aim
was to ensure a spread of experiences and views. To this end, we selected Shetland
(remote island Board; sparse population, small Board population), Ayrshire and Arran
(mix of high and low income areas as well as rural and urban populations), Greater
Glasgow (urban, significant areas of deprivation, high population density, large Board
population), Forth Valley (medium population, mixed rural and urban, mixed socio-
economic characteristics) and Highland (small Board population, rural and remote).
Interviewees in case study sites were selected from both the acute and primary care
sectors. The research design originally proposed eight interviews within each site.
This was modified in several ways to take account of local circumstances. Firstly,
because of the restricted number of senior managers involved in the PAF in Shetland,
only five interviewees were selected from this Board. Secondly, an additional three
interviewees were added to the Greater Glasgow sample to reflect the larger number
of NHS Trusts within this Board. Finally, substitutions were made in response to
intelligence gathered as fieldwork commenced.
Table 1 presents the professional groups originally selected for interview. Some
interviewees were unavailable due to ill health and so some interviews were not
arranged, one was cancelled by the interviewer due to ill-health and some were
cancelled on the day due to the interviewees being unavoidably detained.
Of those who could not attend interviews due to unforeseen circumstances, one
provided a substitute colleague with an excellent knowledge of the PAF. There were
7only two refusals out of a total of 50 initially selected for interview, giving a very
high response rate of 96 per cent.
Table 1 Interview sample by professional group
Professional Group Proposed
sample
Final
sample
Chief Executive (NHS Board) 15 12
Deputy Chief Executive (NHS Board) 0 1
Chief Executive (NHS Trust) 9 7
Chairperson (NHS Board) 5 5
Director of Human Resources (NHS Trust) 5 5
Medical Director (NHS Trust) 4 3
Director of Nursing (NHS Trust) 5 5
Chair, LAMC G.P. Sub-committee 5 4
Other General Practitioner 0 1
Director of Public Health 1 1
Director of Patient Services 1 0
Planning, Policy, Performance & Statistics Personnel 0 7
Scottish Executive 4 3
Total 54 54
In order to compensate for those who were unavailable for interview, substitutes were
selected: either arranged by those unavoidably detained, or by the research team.
Given that the proposed sample did not include managers specifically assigned
responsibility for the PAF, this enabled the sample to be widened in order to
overcome this potential shortcoming of the study. These additional interviewees were
selected for their in-depth knowledge of the PAF on the recommendation of NHS
Board Chief Executives. The right hand column in Table 1 shows the final interview
sample.
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed around a series of questions
relating to the development and implementation of the PAF, the Accountability
Review, the choice of indicators, and the incentives in the system relating to the PAF.
The schedule focused on the perceptions of the PAF as it currently exists rather than
trying to elicit 'what would work'. The questions were primarily about how the PAF is
used and the effect that it has on decision-making. One core interview schedule was
developed and then refined for four different constituent groups, for example, one was
used for NHS Board members, an almost identical schedule was used for the NHS
Trust employees, a third for primary care representatives and the fourth schedule was
for the Scottish Executive interviews. The NHS Board members’ interview schedule
is reproduced in Appendix B.
The schedules were informed by the extensive literature review conducted at the
beginning of the research and were piloted on the medical director of an acute hospital
Trust. Comments were also sought from the PAF Project Management Group. Based
on this feedback and experience, the instrument was adapted and streamlined for ease
of use and several questions were added to explore both implementation and
8accountability more thoroughly. In order to ensure that questions crucial to the
research were both understood and reflected upon, the schedule included some
repetition, although these questions were rephrased and linked to different sections.
Interviews were conducted by three researchers who maintained contact throughout
the project in order to ensure that similar techniques were used. Regular feedback
meetings were held to discuss emerging themes and to identify gaps in understanding
that could be explored further in the interviews. By taking a dynamic approach to the
interviews, the team gained the widest possible understanding of the PAF and its
place within the assessment and monitoring of NHS Boards in Scotland.
All interviews were audio-tape recorded, transcribed, and anonymised prior to
circulation within the research team. Analysis benefited from a team approach where
regular meetings were held to discuss the themes drawn from the transcribed
interviews. Second level interpretation of different aspects of the material was
developed through team discussion, becoming refined through draft writing and
further reflection. Illustrative quotes were selected from a broad range of interviews in
order to represent both the majority view as well as to include a sense of the variation
of opinions, experiences and indeed different Health Board types. In order to ensure
anonymity, however, quotes are taken from across the whole range of interviews
rather than simply the case study sites. For instance, any comments related to small
Boards could have been taken from any of a number of individuals from Borders,
Orkney, Shetland or the Western Isles. Furthermore, although there is much
consensus within Boards, this is by no means total.
Qualitative research material provides a picture or representation of the field of study.
The analysis develops this picture through putting together what is said by a range of
individuals and where possible, placing an interpretative layer on top of this.
Sometimes a major insight is gained from a single sentence uttered by only one
interviewee, which may bring to the fore much that has simply been alluded to by
others. For this reason, we have resisted the temptation to quantify our data; not least
because the nature of qualitative interviews means that often the researcher is obliged
to tailor the questions to the time available and therefore the information contained in
each interview may vary. Where statements are made to offer the reader a sense of
contrasting opinions or consensus, however, in order to maintain consistency, the
following are adhered to:
A 'majority' of interviewees = more than 95 per cent
More than half = more than 50 per cent
A significant minority = less than but more than five
A small number = less than five
Throughout this report, strong endeavours have been made to ensure the anonymity of
the interviewees. To this end, only NHS Board Chief Executives and NHS Trust
Chief Executives are identified by occupation. The numbers of these individuals
interviewed protects the respondents from identification. All other members of NHS
Boards, including Chairpersons, are referred to as NHS Board members and all other
interviewees from NHS Trusts are referred to as NHS Trust members. In some
sections of the report, in order to illustrate the points been made, quotes from
clinicians are distinguished from those of non-clinicians. These ‘clinicians’ might be
9directors of public health, medical directors and nursing directors. In addition all
interviewees are referred to as ‘he’.
Finally, the interview schedule was aimed at capturing a comprehensive overview of
an extremely complex range of issues. This has enabled the research team to present a
report that is wide in scope and depth. In only five months the research team
conducted a literature review; organised and completed fifty-four interviews; had
tapes transcribed then engaged in full analysis and report writing. The rich seam of
analysis tapped into in this report indicates that many of the areas covered by the
research could be fruitful areas of focus in their own right. There remains
considerable scope for future analysis and extension of the themes uncovered at this
exploratory stage.
3.2 Critique of methods
This sub-section briefly raises some of the weaknesses and strengths of the study.
Firstly, while this study has provided an excellent snapshot of a wide range of NHS
Boards and some depth on selected cases, some care has to be exercised in the
generalisability of the findings. It has to be remembered that interviews in most
Boards were largely with the ‘enthusiasts ‘ and the well-informed. Chief Executives
in particular were able to speak eloquently and positively about the PAF system and
many had been signed up to it at its inception. These respondents generally displayed
leadership and high commitment toward measurement and could be persuasive in
their accounts. While not exaggerating the robustness of PAF, they were able to see
how it fitted with other target setting and assessment procedures that were ongoing.
This they used to explain their comfort with PAF as an initiative describing it as
consistent with other management practices.
Clearly such interviewees were motivated to present themselves as forward-thinking,
trend-setters and as endorsing current measurement trends. Yet we did not feel that
interviewees were merely presenting a managerialist ‘spin’. There did seem to be
genuine conviction that the PAF system was working to good effect and threaded
through good practice.
However, the integration of PAF into broader activity and keeping PAF in perspective
was a methodological issue for the study. A number of respondents were concerned
that the study itself exaggerated the status of PAF, giving it more significance that it
really merited in the grand scheme of other target setting, regulatory and quality
measurement activity. This message about PAF being unsensational, incremental and
developmental needs to be kept to the fore and it should be stressed that it has
different salience for different stakeholders.
Another aspect of this study is that it has concentrated on PAF as seen largely from
the top teams in Boards and Trusts. This could be perceived as a limitation. For more
insight into what performance measurement means a wider brief would be necessary.
Similarly there are questions to be addressed about how closely perception of
effective PAF implementation and actual performance are linked. This study has not
attempted this kind of analysis but it would be valuable to investigate whether those
who have very favourable views on PAF are also high performers. A subsequent
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study could select its case studies in terms of high and low PAF performance rather
than the criteria used here of geography, size and socio-economic factors.
This study has hinted at a close connection between performance and leadership but
did not set out systematically to assess different leadership and management styles or
the integration of senior teams. This shortcoming could be addressed in any
subsequent follow up study.
Common to many qualitative studies we have also to bear in mind that there may be
dissonance between what people say and how they behave. There may also be the
concern about independence of the researchers and issues of impartiality with respect
to the study sponsors. We endeavoured to assure informants of academic
independence and do not think this was a huge impediment to gaining authentic
accounts. The team are highly experienced and sought to gain the confidence of all.
The high level of co-operation was interpreted as a mark of salience in the topic and
although some respondents did not expect to have much to say found themselves quite
engaged with the subject.
One of the most challenging aspects of the research has been the time-scale. As we
have noted there has not been scope to tie quantitative data and qualitative data
together. We have not fully exploited the comparative cases to see what makes a
difference. The depth of analysis across Boards has had to be fairly superficial at this
stage and similarly we have not drawn firm conclusions on the strengths and
weaknesses of different PAF approaches within cases. Within the remit all the initial
objectives have been met but we would recommend developing the study further and
some ideas are outlined below.
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4. Key Findings
This section describes and summarises the key data elicited from the interviews. It
follows the structure of the interview schedule reproduced in Appendix B. The
interviewees varied in terms of their depth of knowledge of PAF from those leading in
the PAF initiative to others more remotely or narrowly involved in only one aspect of
the PAF, for example, staff governance. The responses elicited from the interviewees,
therefore, varied in detail and richness in relation to the level of engagement and
understanding of their PAF experiences.
4.1 Introduction
Assessing the performance of public organisations.
A question relating to this theme was asked in order to set the context for the
remaining questions. The majority of interviewees expressed support for the principle
of using performance assessment frameworks as a means of monitoring and
improving performance in the public sector. Driving this support was a positive view
(as opposed to an acceptance) that, given the large amounts of public money that
were spent on the provision of public services (including health care), the
organisations and individuals responsible for the decision-making should be
accountable to the public. Furthermore, there must be transparency with respect to the
use of public monies. This view of the need for accountability and measurement of
performance was generally shared by managers and clinicians alike.
Although the majority of interviewees supported the approach, more than half also
expressed reservations about the implementation and impact of the assessment. The
two most common concerns were the trend towards an overload of assessment and
measurement and the temptation for PAF to become an end in itself.
This second concern was expressed in two ways, each subtly different to the other. As
one NHS Board member stated:
'What I am concerned about, of course, is the common industry in itself -
we start feeding it rather than it feeding us’ (Interview 13).
And from a Trust Chief Executive:
'I think in the public sector there is now a view emerging that perhaps we have
gone too far and that the targets themselves have become the end products
rather than improvement in service' (Interview 3).
Furthermore, one NHS Board Chief Executive warned that 'it [performance
assessment] has created an industry and cost that is not commensurate with how the
information is actually used at the end of the day' (Interview 33).
Common to the majority of interviews, however, were positive comments to the effect
that the current system was welcomed because it was more systematic than previous
systems. It also complemented and extended what was already in place, rather than
representing a sharp break with earlier monitoring systems.
12
Another Trust Chief Executive stated that, while the PAF adds value to the existing
management systems, it needs to be regarded as a longer term project that is worth
sticking with. This theme of persisting with the initiative was echoed by others.
Comparing the Scottish PAF with other systems, for example the English star
system
More than half of the interviewees did not feel qualified to compare the Scottish and
English systems. Of those responding, the majority preferred the Scottish system. In
particular, they were not in favour of adopting league tables and the public use that
was made of these in England. One interviewee, however, suggested that it could be
useful to compare Health Boards of similar size and catchments. The suggestion was
that rather than establishing a hierarchy, it could be useful for establishing a dialogue
for the cross-fertilisation of ideas.
'I guess the difference is that the English Star System was used in a very public
manner to drive a particular agenda in a particularly adversarial manner. The
PAF has not so far in Scotland been used in that way because I think the
cultural  [milieu of]  involving politicians and managers is a more integrated
collegial one than exists in England' (Interview 21, NHS Board Chief
Executive).
The majority was also in favour of performance management as it was being applied
in Scotland. The following illustrates this sentiment:
'I am reasonably optimistic about it. Perhaps not so much about the measures
themselves but more the direction of travel in terms of trying to make it a
partnership and trying to move forward together' (Interview 3, NHS Trust
Chief Executive).
4.2 Sensitivity and scope of the indicators
There were mixed reactions to the appropriateness of the indicators as a representation
of the Boards' performance ranging from satisfaction with the instrument as it is
through to recommendations for improvements.
It was felt that there was still room for improvement with respect to the adequacy of
the performance indicators and that there were gaps in the coverage (or scope).
Although there was some frustration that this was the case, there was an acceptance
that the framework is a 'work in progress' (Interview 5, NHS Board Chief Executive)
with some refinement still needed.
In contrast, a common concern expressed by the interviewees was that there is an
excessive number of indicators and that the numbers are growing year on year. Indeed
one interviewee revealed that in the developmental stage of the PAF, it was intended
that there should be 'a maximum of nine [indicators]' (Interview. 5, NHS Board Chief
Executive).
The positive aspect of the growth of the PAF is that it may be regarded as a 'living
thing' which is dynamic and responsive to change. However, fears that it will continue
to expand led to a significant minority of interviewees adopting phrases such as
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'feeding the beast'. The notion of a greedy, consuming monster in danger of getting
out of control was a frequently used metaphor, even by interviewees who were very
positive about the framework.
Curiously, despite the concern with respect to the size of the PAF, more than half of
the same interviewees recommended the addition of indicators for areas that are not
covered by the current measures. Other respondents reported satisfaction with the
range of indicators. This appeared to be associated with respondents who were
confident in their management team's ability to subsume the PAF within their existing
management structure.
More than half of all respondents highlighted that the PAF data on its own is
misleading: this was considered particularly pertinent to small NHS Boards, although
similar comments were gathered across the range of Health Board sizes.
'On its own without any contextual background it’s potentially dangerous for a
board area our size' (Interview 22, NHS Board Chief Executive).
'So it’s quite important to actually try to get behind the indicators to
understand the basis of those indicators and how they might or might not
apply in particular parts of our area' (Interview 25, NHS Board member).
Similarly, some interviewees expressed the view that there was a temptation to
measure things that can easily be measured and that the PAF does not allow for the
assessment of outcomes. This means that it does not always capture change and
improvement.
'the PAF measures areas where we can measure, it’s often the things that are
more difficult to measure that are important' (Interview 3, NHS Trust Chief
Executive).
'…because the service redesign indicators are very input driven … I mean it
says something like how much do you spend…how much of your spend is
dedicated to service redesign?  But I think it needs to be more output focussed
…I mean you could spend all you like on beds and redesign but its actually
about the outputs, and if we take [medical specialty] as one of the outputs then
we need to…Get that focus to be more outcome and output focussed  […]
because that is the bit that really makes the difference' (Interview 11, NHS
Trust member).
It was suggested that the PAF mainly illuminates things that management already
knows about and although the potential utility of the instrument is acknowledged, it
needs to be explored further:
'to be really useful a performance assessment system should tell me something
that I don’t know' (Interview 3, NHS Trust Chief Executive).
Respondents pointed out that there is a danger that managers focus only on improving
parts of the service that are currently measured in order to be seen to be outstanding
rather than simply 'average'. Indeed it could be argued that NHS Boards performing
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the best on the PAF might not necessarily have the highest quality of services. One
interviewee described how his Board was setting a high target to be the best in
Scotland on a particular service that was already adequate. He felt that this was to
earn 'brownie points' with the Scottish Executive at the expense of the rest of the
service. Furthermore he said that the service offered was 'making a rod for our own
back' (Interview 34) partly also because they did not have the complementary services
for which demand would be generated.
Factors affecting whether Boards can meet targets
As might be expected, the majority of interviewees indicated that financial resources
were one of the main things that affected whether Boards could meet their targets.
Another major concern was in the arena of recruitment and retention. A particular
problem across the Boards is the lack of NHS dentists and a significant minority of
interviews raised this as an example of something that is outwith their control and yet
still measured within the PAF. Furthermore, this was raised as an example where
change and improvement could be effected at the national level only through training
more dentists.
Small Boards in particular face particular problems in recruitment and retention that
often lead to the cost of employing consultant locums. A further problem is the
difficulty of achieving compliance and co-operation from clinicians in referral
centres, although they report excellent relationships with their own clinicians.
'Our visiting consultants and the clinicians and the clinical services we get
from [city], we do have some problems in those areas and that is harder to
have influence over and harder to have the same direct relationships because
we don’t manage those clinicians' (Interview 32).
In the Health Improvement area of the PAF, there are several indicators which are
viewed as partly beyond a Health Board's control and dependent on the involvement
of other agencies and the socio-economic characteristics of the Board area.
Areas for improvement
A significant minority of respondents was also eager to include areas that were not
covered. Although the aim of the interviews was to remain general with respect the
appropriateness of the existing indictors, inevitably there was some discussion of
specific indicators and areas of perceived weakness.
Health inequalities and health improvement were areas that were often cited as
examples where the PAF failed to capture change and improvement. The quote below
shows an appreciation of the difficulties faced by the PAF, acknowledging that they
are endemic to the health care sector. In addition, there was evidence of a quite
pragmatic view that while the PAF may not capture every nuance of the health sector,
overall it does capture good and bad performance.
'I think [the PAF Indicators] give a fairly good snapshot of our performance.
The difficulty I think isn’t intrinsic to the PAF as it is to the nature of health
care. For example, part of our board’s performance is exemplified in our
vision is to reduce health inequalities. By it’s very nature that’s a long term
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effort and the PAF’s ability to track that in a year on year basis is inevitably
more difficult. But we use the PAF as part of our accountability process and I
am comfortable that in the long term it shows whether we’re performing well
or we are performing badly' (Interview 21, NHS Board Chief Executive).
One interviewee was concerned that the health improvement and health inequality
indicators are not sensitive to the efforts of the Boards to address them. Further,
efforts to work with Local Authorities are not measured by the PAF. (See Appendix
A: 3).
One NHS Board Chairperson commented that, since health improvement and health
inequalities in Scotland were the worst in Europe, achieving an average score on the
PAF was still far from ideal. He suggested that this was one area where the targets
were simply not challenging enough, albeit agreeing with the majority of respondents
who raised this that it must be assessed over the long term.
Staff Governance was another area felt to be neglected by the PAF:
'I think it [staff governance] needs to be more developed, and I think it needs to
be given a higher level …[of priority in the PAF]…' (Interview 45, NHS Trust
member).
From another perspective, staff governance was still being developed and this area
was seen to be improving:
'The HR site has really just been since last year with the staff governance, self
assessment audit tool and this was the first year of the PAF against the audit
tool. I think that that will be beneficial from next year onwards because at
least you have got a benchmark of how you are continuing to perform'
(Interview 16).
Poor data collection techniques were highlighted as a particular problem in the health
service. This was commented on by a small number of people who expressed
concerns that there is no standardised method of data collection. The PAF, one person
elaborated, was 'only as good as what it’s fed' (Interview 32).b
'You know, better clinical information systems seems to me will get us further
along the route of capturing more of what goes on in ways that will be useful
as management information - but we’re a few years yet away from that'
(Interview 32).
Another person recommended that NHS managers take a step back and ask questions
about what the PAF was intended for; refine it towards those objectives and also
design information systems capable of gathering robust data that will not be
questioned or regarded with suspicion at the local level. This could also address the
replication of data collection, monitoring or auditing visits by outside agencies,
perceived by many to be an ongoing problem. (See Appendix A: 2)
                                                          
b See also Appendix A: 5
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Primary care assessment was reported to be not as robust as other areas.
'They [the PAF indicators] focus on a set number of things which are based on
things that we currently measure and I would say probably it reflects more
about what happens in my [Acute] trust than happens in the primary care trust
which is very…isn’t really reflected at all' (Interview 24, NHS Trust Chief
Executive).
This was related to discussions that ranged across the interviews regarding the merits
of various forms of assessment. While it was outwith the scope of the interviews to
capture the fine details such as the merits of 'self' assessment versus the assessments
performed by monitoring agencies, clearly there was some debate linked to the
efficacy of what was referred to as 'softer measures'. This discussion is very much
located in debates surrounding qualitative and quantitative data.
The majority of interviewees who raised the issue of Primary Care assessments were
not in favour of the way that data was currently collected. They appeared to favour
'harder' measures, which was another way of referring to quantifiable indicators. The
interesting dilemma embedded in these various discussions, however, was that while
on the one hand 'hard data' was favoured, it was also clear from other parts of the
interview that 'softer' data was essential in order to contextualise this. Similarly, it was
also recognised that the areas that were subject to quantitative measures, were not
necessarily always what interviewees felt to be the most important aspects of the
service. Furthermore, it was clear that there were some areas that simply could not be
captured in any meaningful way by quantitative measurement. It would appear then,
that the challenge for the Scottish Executive is to develop a more robust form of
qualitative data collection.
One NHS Trust member commented that the acute sector is much more driven by
targets and adverse publicity than the Primary Sector because the latter is harder to
measure: 'You name it, the acute sector lands everybody in it' (Interview 43). Indeed a
Primary Care Trust member elaborated:
'No I think they [PAF indicators] are much more…well they seem to be more
orientated towards Acute Trusts and I think that is just the nature of the beast.
I think its easier…because of the nature of the activity that occurs in the Acute
Trusts where people are kind of in and out and through the door, then you are
looking at activity which can be measured. Its much more difficult in the
Primary Care Services, even where they are bed based because they are not
based on specific interventions its much more difficult to produce comparative
information and a lot of the work that takes place in the Primary Care Trusts
which is around influencing and corralling and bringing about change in a
very different kind of way to saying this is the target that we have got to
achieve and this is…and how are we going to achieve it?  It’s much more
difficult to do that in a Primary Care setting (Interview 18).c
One interviewee suggested that financial performance in terms of 'unit costs' were not
adequately represented in the framework.
                                                          
c For further elaboration and examples from this interview see Appendix A: 6.
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Some issues relating to small boards
Small NHS Boards encounter their own specific problems with the PAF indicators
and also the difficulties experienced by larger boards are magnified for them. One of
the major problems that they face is that some indicators are inappropriate for small
boards since the numbers are so small that the PAF scores are meaningless:
'in some areas we could go from the best to the worst in the country or vice
versa on the basis of three or four patients. So that shows that its not very
sensitive for a small board area but we’re okay with that as long as the
contextual discussions around it take place and as long as its not used for
other reasons than its currently being used' (Interview 22, NHS Board Chief
Executive).
In order to combat this problem, one interviewee suggested that it was more useful to
examine morbidity rather than mortality:
'But what’s much more meaningful is looking at a trend in the number of
presentations at hospital where the primary diagnosis is cancer or stroke. And
then looking at outcomes in terms of successful treatments and possibly
looking at the admission rates and transfer rates and so on. Much of the work
we did with the health plan is based on that, not death' (Interview 31, NHS
Trust member).
Despite these problems around small numbers, one interviewee said, 'the PAF was the
trigger that made us look at, why is that up, why is that down?' (Interview 19, NHS
Board member). Common to other Boards (including large ones) was the feeling that
although the PAF has some measurement issues to sort out, nevertheless it helps to
'focus' on particular issues.
NHS Board as level of data presentation
The majority of respondents agreed that the NHS Board level is the right level at
which to collect data and implement the PAF. The arguments offered were that the
Board is the site of strategic planning, the Trusts are being dissolved and senior
managers in the Trusts already have positions of responsibility within NHS Boards.
'Yes, I think over all it is the right place but we just need to make sure that it’s
not seen as an isolated event that doesn’t involve the rest of the system really'
(Interview 11, NHS Trust member).
The above quote, however, alludes to the warning that data should be disaggregated at
the Trust level in order to help the Boards understand and respond to the information.
4.3 Relative importance of indicators
The question of ‘what are the most important indicators?’ produced a mix of
responses. The majority said that ‘waiting times’ and ‘finance’ had to be priorities
because that was one of the main things they were measured on. The answers
emphasised indicators that had a high degree of public and political visibility. There
does not appear to be disagreement with the need for financial performance to be
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given priority. However the views on the weight given to waiting times were often
negative, especially from the medical and nursing directors interviewed.
‘..we didn’t need the PAF to be understanding the political realities of waiting
lists though I think they’re disproportionate. So I understand why the waiting
list stuff is there politically but I think its out of proportion to some of the other
aspects of service actually' (Interview 32).
One interviewee explained the problem with waiting times thus:
'We operate the performance assessment on the estimated waiting times across
the board, without any assessment of clinical priority, without any assessment
of demand versus need' (Interview 34, NHS Trust member).
The lack of sophistication of waiting time as a key indicator was stressed as a
concern. This was with respect to its failure to discriminate between different
conditions in terms of clinical risk.
The majority of interviewees stated that waiting times and finance were a top priority
because there was simply no choice in the matter and it was regarded as also being a
top priority with the Scottish Executive. (See Appendix A: 4).
Managers also indicated that otherwise health improvement was their priority because
the health of the local population should be their main concern. When questioned
further, respondents usually acknowledged that this was also regarded as one of the
top priorities of the Scottish Executive. There was also the suggestion that there is
nevertheless not enough weight placed on this area and that more sensitive tools and
data collection techniques need to be developed.
Clinicians often mentioned heart disease, cancer and diabetes as the headline
(political) priorities. While there was general agreement that these are important, there
was concern that other areas of clinical care are not necessarily subject to such close
scrutiny by the service. A small number of all interviewees warned that there is the
danger of targeting resources at the areas that are measured and measurable to the
detriment of the rest of the service.
One NHS Board Chief Executive provided an incisive discussion of the relative
importance of the PAF indicators in which all of the above came into play. (See
Appendix A: 7). Although waiting times and finance were crucial, so too was health
improvement. However, along with this was the recognition that the rest of the service
was also important – with a high emphasis being placed on clinical governance and
the quality of care. Although clinicians may be more inclined to be critical of waiting
times and finance, nevertheless they too acknowledged the need to use resources
effectively.
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4.4 Changing behaviour, the Accountability Review and Incentives
PAF supporting and encouraging improved performance
There were different responses to the question of whether the PAF supported and
encouraged improved performance. These ranged from total agreement to negative
responses. Moreover, within any one Board, although there tended to be a shared
ethos and approach to the PAF in general, there was not necessarily a consensus on
whether or not the PAF supported and encouraged improved performance. For
instance, within one Board, an interviewee responded negatively to the question of
whether the PAF supported and encouraged improved performance. The interviewee
explained this with reference to the lack of incentives within the system. This person
felt that good performance was not financially rewarded while poor performers were
often 'bailed out' with additional funding. (See Appendix A: 8a). Another interviewee
from the same NHS Board responded positively, that the PAF was good for morale
because it clearly shows areas of good performance.
'it gives you some idea of where you are sitting against other people. I suppose
it goes part of the way and then its over to each health system to take that and
make an environment where continuous improvement and improving across
all of these areas is actually encouraged and supported and so I think it starts
that process yes' (Interview 11, NHS Trust member).
On reflection, part of this dissimilarity of views may be due to the respondents’
interpretation of the question. The first interviewee was very supportive of the PAF in
general and interpreted this part of the interview to be wholly about incentives while
the second interviewee took a wider view of the expression ‘encourage and support’.
Over half of the managers agreed that the PAF supported and encouraged improved
performance.
This question of supporting and encouraging improved performance tended to elicit
discussions of how the PAF is used to identify weak areas that need to be closely
monitored throughout the year, in this way encouraging improved performance.
There were some concerns that the PAF only supports and encourages improved
performance in areas that are measured.
One interviewee questioned the central role of PAF:
'PAF, yes it does help to improve performance but actually there’s a whole lot
of other powers and tools that we use to improve performance' (Interview 28,
NHS Board Chief Executive).
PAF and the Accountability Review
The majority of interviewees support the new Accountability Review process, which
is regarded as being much less ‘adversarial’ than previously. It is seen now as more of
a dialogue between NHS Board management teams and the Scottish Executive
Accountability Review team.
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This appears in part to be due to the introduction of the PAF into the process. Over
half of the interviewees mentioned something to the effect that the PAF gives a clear
structure to the accountability review and that the PAF scoring system allows
management to come to the table prepared for the discussion of problem areas. Indeed
one of the most positive aspects of the new system is, as one NHS Trust member
expressed: 'by the time the PAF visit comes there shouldn’t be any surprises'
(Interview 16).
However, the increased positive perception of the Accountability process was not
entirely attributed to the integration of the PAF. The new style of leadership at the
Scottish Executive Health Department was welcomed and appeared to have gained
much support and this coincided with the introduction of the PAF.
'Yes and I don’t think this is just about the PAF. I think this is also about the
style of the folk at the executive but the accountability review is much more
now about not having surprises. About understanding the areas for discussion
and exchanging information prior to accountability review and then talking
through issues that need to be talked through. So I think it has developed in
that way over recent years. I think the PAF is part of that because it forms the
bedrock of information but I think it’s also a style thing as well' (Interview
22).
In addition to the above, there are other factors which were reported to have
contributed to making the Accountability Review a more positive experience. It is
regarded as much more inclusive: firstly, because the review team now go to Boards
rather than ‘summon’ them to Edinburgh as in the past; and secondly, because they
include a wider range of personnel in each Health Board.
It must also be borne in mind that the PAF does not drive the entire Accountability
Review, as one interviewee pointed out, 'the Accountability Review team are looking
beyond I would say […] what is in PAF alone' (Interview 11, NHS Trust member).
There was a mixed response to the question of whether the PAF changes the focus or
direction of the Boards’ activities or priorities.  Major changes in priority, post-
Review, appear to be minimal. This was partly attributed this to the fact that the PAF
was directing them towards priorities which they would be addressing anyway.
Rewards and penalties associated with the PAF for Boards / Trusts
When looking at the responses regarding incentives and rewards more widely, it is
clear that the majority of interviewees do not see any direct, tangible incentives within
the system.
'There’s no financial incentive, or resource incentive. Equally, unless
something is dire there isn’t any harsh penalty. So, there is no incentive
associated with the PAF. It’s more of a system to continually improve
performance, but there isn’t any hard incentive or penalty associated with it'
(Interview 41, NHS Trust Chief Executive).
A small number of interviewees suggested that there was a need to address what is
perceived as the perverse incentives or inequitable situation at present where ‘failing’
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Boards are ‘bailed out’ with extra cash and those managing their finances well are not
incentivised. (See Appendix A: 8a). However, at the same time it was appreciated that
punishing Boards in difficulty by withdrawing funds or cutting their budgets was not
a solution. Similarly, although recognition of a job well done is important, the
majority of interviewees were not in favour of going down the ‘league-tables’ route.
One clear reward mentioned by over half of the respondents, was the Accountability
Review letter from the Chief Executive of the SEHD. This was reported to be a
valuable source of feedback to all of the personnel within a Health Board and a
meaningful way of crediting staff for their efforts. In some cases, the letters are
published in the local press, in others they are published on the Internet but in all
cases the letter is widely circulated throughout the Trusts to all levels of staff. It was
regarded as acknowledgement of a job well done that was highly appreciated.
Furthermore, where Boards allocated specific targets or indicators as individual areas
of responsibility, this meant that those responsible for good performance could also
receive the praise of their peers.
For the small NHS Boards, recognition from the local population seemed to play a
greater role (compared to the larger Boards) in motivating managers and for some,
this seemed to rival the importance of the Health Department recognition. This was
mainly due to their higher profiles in the local population than the equivalent figures
in the larger (and perhaps more anonymous) Boards.
Some interviewees suggested that there was too much monitoring, which is
particularly onerous for small Boards with low numbers of personnel. A significant
minority of interviewees suggested that they would value increased autonomy as a
reward for doing well. (See Appendix A: 9).
'I suppose I see [earned autonomy] … as a way of reducing the burden of
inspections and assessments and that sort of stuff' (Interview 32).
Increased autonomy took two forms in the interviews, both of which were seen as
demonstrations of trust in the Boards by the Scottish Executive. The first was a
reduction in the number of monitoring visits and the second was greater freedom in
the allocation of spending by the Boards.
Junior doctors hours and compliance with this directive was raised as an example
where failing to meet targets would result in severe penalties such as losing posts.
'if you think about penalties, one that we were waiting to get information as to
whether it would apply, I suppose the whole thing about the new deal and
junior doctors and how we are doing about getting junior doctors hours to be
compliant. We have done a huge amount of work in the last year, its just
phenomenal the kind of increase in compliance but we are still at kind of 85%
compliance and there was always the threat that what would happen if you
weren’t compliant by August 2003, is that you would have the post taken away
from you' (Interview 11, NHS Trust member).
22
Rewards and penalties for individuals
Performance-related pay was identified in the interviews as an explicit individual
financial reward linked to the PAF that was used by some Boards. This was especially
applicable in Boards which assigned individual responsibility for the seven areas of
the PAF to senior managers, therefore naturally linking individual achievements to
progress in their own PAF area.
However, the level of the financial incentives associated with this type of
remuneration were not viewed as instrumental in affecting the level of effort exerted
by staff in their work.
'I suppose you would then argue that the output of the performance pay by a
number of people I don’t think is as high as…we only got it circulated last
week, and we were talking about an inflation uplift to pay ranges of 2.25%
which is less than most other staff groups. So I think a lot of people will
probably be feeling [that] individually I am not rewarded' (Interview 11, NHS
Trust member).
Interviewees were more inclined to talk about the individual reward of knowing that a
job was well done and it was this sense of job satisfaction and achievement that
mattered. (See Appendix A: 10a).
'I think what the NHS has been a wee bit remiss of in the past is
acknowledging when folk are doing well, they are very committed and caring
folk and I think that is the only benefit you want out of it really' (Interview 13,
NHS Board member).
Performance related pay appeared to be an explicit way in which the Board could
acknowledge individual effort. It seemed to play a symbolic role in rewarding
individuals.
Although the above comments on performance related pay could also be applied to
the NHS Board Chief Executive, the main theme raised with respect to rewards and
penalties for Chief Executives was job security. When one Chief Executive was asked
what incentives there were in the system, the reply was:
‘I guess the incentive is staying in a job, you know. NHS Chief Executives are,
or being an NHS Chief Executive is not particularly good for your health, we
don’t last in them too long, it would seem' (Interview 10).
Another respondent felt that it was only right that those in positions of power in NHS
Boards should be removed from post if they were not delivering: particularly since
they were responsible for public money and public services. (See Appendix A: 10b).
The perceptions, which emerged from the discussion in this section of the interviews,
were that becoming the post of NHS Board Chief Executive was both a prestigious
office and one that was risky. One interviewee reported that (to his knowledge) the
average length of office was only two to three years and another that of a total of 15
Chief Executives of Scottish Health Boards, four had lost their jobs in the recent past.
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Whether or not this is accurate, it does reflect a real perception of vulnerability of the
position of Chief Executives in NHSScotland. (See Appendix A: 11a).
One interviewee spoke of the difficulties of managing such a large organisation.
While they felt that a chief executive should not remain in post if they failed to meet
the requirements, nevertheless it was felt that there was a certain element of luck
involved. (See Appendix A: 11b). This was clearly illustrated in another interview
where an NHS Board Chief Executive explained that something such as a death
caused by clinical negligence, while outwith the direct control of the Chief Executive,
could nevertheless potentially result in removal from post: an example of the ultimate
accountability of NHS Board leaders. (See Appendix A: 11c). There appears to be a
serious issue embedded in these narratives: while some senior managers are able to
move sideways within the organisation, there is the problem of how to relocate them
without losing their considerable talent to other sectors.
4.5 Implementation of the PAF
The majority of interviewees were very positive about the consultation process and
the help that they received to implement the PAF. More than half also said that there
was readily available ongoing help from the Health Department – either people would
come out to the Board or were otherwise available to advise from a distance.
There were a small number of interviewees who were not positive about the
consultation process, mainly associated with either a negative attitude towards the
PAF, seeing it perhaps as a top-down initiative over which they could exert limited
influence. For instance, one NHS Trust member explained:
'I didn’t give a [care], and that’s not being nasty, I just looked at it and
thought great thing, fantastic. If the Trust signs up to it, as it will, then fine I’ll
do my bit. I didn’t see as I could have any ability to change things ….'
This sentiment can be linked to what may be regarded as a 'traditional' division
between managers (or more precisely, 'management', 'finance' and 'business') and
clinicians, which is explored further below. Equally it might symbolise the sense of
disempowerment of those who feel distanced from the decision-makers at the Centre.
The interviewee also revealed, however, that they were not necessarily opposed to the
PAF per se but did not appear to feel any sense of ownership of the system.
Small Boards experienced different problems. One interviewee said that the
presentation from the Scottish Executive team did not inform them beyond what they
already knew. Furthermore, they emphasised the lack of sensitivity to and absence of
technical expertise pertaining to small-scale data. One respondent describes his
frustrations thus:
'So for instance we did the work on how much change in our numbers we’d
have to get to see a change - a trend in line with the PAF targets for instance.
We’ve done that work. I’ve never found anybody at the centre who either
thought of the need to do that for smaller areas or could do it. So we present
to the Scottish Executive something that says, “This is why this target is not
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meaningful for us because this is the number of events that we need to have in
order to change our direction”' (Interview 32).
Management leadership style and its effect on the implementation of the PAF
There are clear signs from the accounts that respondents linked effective
implementation of the PAF to strong and effective leadership. A particularly popular
form of implementation is the creation of teams around groups of PAF indicators.
This management configuration ensures that each senior manager has particular areas
of responsibility. (See Appendix A: 12).
Over half of the interviewees stated that the PAF was integrated into strategic
planning. For this reason, the majority of interviewees were unable to say how much
time was committed to addressing the PAF, since it was embedded in management
processes in such a way that they could not easily discriminate between discrete PAF
and non-PAF activity.
'The way we’ve kind of used the PAF is we’ve used it in two ways. We’ve used
it as a measuring tool to see how well are we doing. But we’ve also used the
data from it to inform our planning activities. So we’re kind of using it as an
output thing but we’re also using it as a performance measure. Which I think
is probably the right way to use it. It’s not either/or.’ (Interview 29, NHS
Board Chief Executive)d
One interviewee, however, raised the concern that the current culture of monitoring
and performance management could constrain creative local solutions:
'…can we built a safeguard for local innovation and local inventiveness?  That
worries me actually, because otherwise everybody’s doing the same thing. The
whole thing is moving forward in the same way' (Interview 30, NHS Board
member).
Integration and filtering down within the system
These interviews suggest that filtering down of PAF does not appear to go very far
beyond senior management. However while overt knowledge of the PAF fails to
travel far down the system, staff are in fact often dealing with issues connected to the
PAF without necessarily knowing it. One interviewee stated that it was not necessary
for staff on the 'frontline' of patient care to be aware of the PAF, just as there was no
need for staff to understand the intricacies of 'management systems'. He elaborated,
'[It’s] about knowing how we are doing and having a plan for improvement,
it’s all happening, maybe it doesn’t matter that people don’t know about the
PAF per se' (Interview 11).
Indeed, there are indications that the PAF may be an increased aid to management
when it is more integrated and hence 'invisible' to those who do not deal with it in a
managerial capacity.
                                                          
d For further elaboration of the implementation of PAF and its link to planning, see Appendix A: 12c &
12d.
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Managers and clinicians
It is difficult to say anything definitive regarding the attitudes of clinicians towards
the PAF owing to the small number of interviewees, however some themes emerged
from the data.
The majority of managers commented that they maintained excellent relationships
with clinicians. However, it was clear from the broad range of interviews that
although there was much in the way of partnership and positive relationships,
nevertheless there were still areas of contention. As one NHS Board Chief Executive
commented,
'There are tensions if you look at just waiting times. The clinicians say this is
crazy… we shouldn’t have these, and we aren’t given adequate funding for it
[…]. But when you talk of the cost of the system, mathematically it doesn’t
balance. So, there are tensions, but these are good tensions (Interview 33).
One Chief Executive, although reporting good relationships within that Board, also
reported that one of the potential dangers was that if clinicians were not ‘on board’
they could act to the detriment of a manager.
'Now if you are a clinician in another area you might well think to yourself,
why would we bother we’ll spend money, we’ll improve the service to our
patients because that’s what we’re there for and if the chairman and chief
executive get sacked it’s a price worth paying' (Interview 5).
With respect to the consultation process on the PAF, one clinician was antipathetic to
the question of consultation, feeling he would have to comply whatever the outcome.
Another clinician said that he was not in post when the consultations were ongoing;
another speculated that few Nursing and Medical Directors had been involved in the
consultation process: something that was possibly responsible for the fact that clinical
governance and quality issues were often reported (across the whole range of
interviews) as areas that were neglected in the PAF. These may be transitional
outcomes relating to the early stage of PAF implementation and clinical staff would
not be expected necessarily to be ‘frontrunners’. Alternatively it may reveal that the
depth of congruence or alignment between managerial and clinical cultures is
overstated.
It appears from this research that these professional groups are supportive of the
principle of accountability and indeed the majority also cautiously welcomes the PAF
as a tool to enhance this. This is underscored by the previously sceptical clinician
(Interview 43) who goes on to endorse PAF thus:
'No, I genuinely think it [the PAF] is valuable, but for me it doesn’t affect my
day to day behaviour, it doesn’t affect the targets and the areas I see myself
responsible for' (Interview 43).
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4.6 Local and national accountability
Local accountability
The interviewees were not especially positive or complimentary with respect to the
PAF’s success in terms of increasing local accountability. Over half of the
respondents felt that it was too complex for the general public to understand, although
one interviewee suggested that this was one way of ensuring that media interest was
kept at bay.
'I struggled with it [the PAF] and I would have thought that given my
background in [professional area] and very much working with statistics that I
probably had a head start on a lot of people and I did struggle with it to be
absolutely honest. […] So if you’re just picking it up in a report or a
newspaper and you’re a member of the public you’re just going to look at it
and say, “What does that mean”?' (Interview 19, NHS Board member).
The PAF nevertheless was perceived as playing an indirect role in enhancing local
accountability since a significant minority of interviewees explained that information
from the PAF is fed into the local health plan; made available through newsletters
distributed with the local free press; published on Health Board websites and so on.
One of the concerns, which links into the problem of measurement and gaps in the
indicators, is that the PAF does not provide the kind of information that is most
meaningful to the general public. This is because the PAF fails to capture the
experience of health service users.
'[W]e publish the accountability letter and the annual report and it goes to the
board. I mean I think board members take that seriously. I’m not sure that the
general public out there in [Board area] does because they judge the service
on their experience last time they came to the hospital or what they think
they’re going to get out of their GP next time they go and see him and their
expectations of what the service delivers isn’t summed up necessarily in the
PAF. I mean clearly it is in some things but not in others. You know, it doesn’t
capture the quality of experience that those people have…' (Interview 32).e
A key mechanism through which the public is informed of Board performance is the
publication of the Accountability Review letter. These letters are partially based
around the PAF and do serve to place the PAF data into the context of the local
situation in terms of the local NHS Board’s performance over time and in relation to
other Boards. However, investigation of the nature of the content of the published
extracts and their impact would be required to determine whether this gives the public
a balanced view of their Board’s performance.
National accountability
As noted above, the need to contextualise the PAF data means that on its own the
PAF can be misleading regarding the performance of a particular Board. As long as
the PAF data is tied in with the Accountability Review, during which the data can be
presented in terms of the local context then it plays a part in accountability but it does
                                                          
e See also Appendix A: 15.
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not contribute to this on its own except as something potentially misleading and
damaging.
The problem for senior managers, however, is that Boards must also respond to
political pressures both at national level and at the level of their local population
through the pressures brought to bear by local Members of Parliament and the media.
Attention may be brought to bear locally on things that do not arise in the PAF but
nevertheless could become major issues that executives are obliged to respond to.
Therefore there is a tension between accountability to the Parliament through the PAF
targets and local accountability.
Some respondents expressed a fear that the PAF could become a political tool, easily
expanded at the whim of politicians eager to monitor particular areas: particularly
since interviewees were aware of and sympathetic to the political environment in
which the initiatives were forged. Indeed one NHS Board Chief Executive went so far
as to say,
'the department and the politicians are creating a rod for their own back. To
set targets that may not be achievable […] that's bad news for everybody'
(Interview 33).
Any other comments
The respondents were given an opportunity at the end of the interview to raise any
issues, which they considered important relating to PAF, but which had not been
addressed by the schedule. The majority took this opportunity to reiterate their general
support for the system. The quote below is indicative of these positive comments and
highlights the need for persistence with the assessment tool:
'The only thing I would encourage is that we stick with it, because I think a lot
of these things come and go because people perceive them not to be delivering
what it is that they want and therefore politicians, or whatever, will want
something else in place. I think from our experience in terms of performance
management, you have to stick with a system in order to get people used to it,
ownership, and that will take time because it’s not something you can do
overnight. It’s almost a culture thing that does take time. So I would
encourage the executive, or whatever, to stay with it and use it in a way that it
links as much more of a tool that can be used systematically in the
organisation. And not to give up on it, which there is a great temptation,
having been involved in performance management systems around
individuals. There is a great temptation to change the performance
management system every two or three years because somebody either thought
something else, but I think you need to stick with it if you are really going to
try and improve performance. So, that would be my plea, if you like'
(Interview 41, NHS Trust Chief Executive).
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5. Discussion
In this section we draw together the results to identify the key findings of the study in
relation to the three objectives of the PAF which form the basis of this investigation.
Each is briefly discussed in the context of existing related literature.
Before examining each of the objectives, it important to note from the results that the
system of PAF is welcomed in principle by the NHS in Scotland though with some
reservations. In addition to the evidence of support from the interview transcripts, the
salience of the system is reinforced by the high response rate of the study. Further,
this response rate adds weight to the findings here as a wide coverage of personnel
and Boards was achieved.
5.1 Objective 1. ‘Support and encourage sustained improvement in the
performance of NHS Scotland by focussing on key measures in relation to health
priorities.’
The wider literature on performance and incentives suggests that, of key importance
to the successful working of the PAF is the sensitivity and scope of the indicators, as
well as the mechanisms that are being used to ‘support and encourage’ improvement
in performance. In an environment such as the NHS with its multiple objectives and
outcomes and complex tasks, having strong incentives associated with a small number
of short term performance indicators can cause problems such as myopia, narrow
focus and gaming (e.g. the ratchet effect). The extent to which the PAF does and will
suffer from these problems is not clear. If the incentives linked to the PAF are not
strong and the PAF is mainly presented as a forum for discussion at the
Accountability Reviews, the 'over-focussing’ on particular indicators is less likely to
cause such perverse incentives.
A balance needs to be achieved between, on the one hand, ensuring the wide scope of
the indicators and, on the other, the burden of the data collection and qualitative
assessments for the PAF and the Accountability Review. The data from the interviews
confirmed that, for the PAF to work well, the indicators within it need to be accurate
representations of the required performance and to encapsulate the essence of a good
performing NHS. The overall view was that the PAF was quite burdensome, though
this depended upon the extent to which the Boards integrated the PAF into the day-to-
day management of the local health service. However, there was an appreciation that
the provision and planning of health care is a complex undertaking and as such
requires a complex performance monitoring system. It was widely believed that the
PAF gave a good indication of a Board’s performance. Despite this general
acceptance, there seems to be a strong concern that any future developments of the
system focus on its refinement. By refinement the respondents did not appear to
suggest that the PAF should be reduced in data volume but that some existing
indicators or new (i.e. substitute) indicators should be developed to more accurately
reflect activity, effort and output.
Concern was raised with respect to myopia and over narrowing of focus of Boards
energies and activities. A potential problem raised in the interviews was that yearly
targets could constrain innovation and long term planning. When managers are forced
to meet short term targets rather than take longer term views, some areas of the
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service which are not monitored may suffer because of the need to allocate scarce
resources to politically 'hot' areas. Similarly, the issue of how managers balance good
performance on PAF indicators while encouraging innovation and creativity is an
ongoing challenge of leadership. This was raised in two contexts. First, the risks
associated with innovation, may be avoided by managers as the costs of failure are
viewed as too great and second the energy and skills required to innovate may be lost
as the incentives are to meet immediate targets not to examine opportunities for
excellence. These problems are potentially exacerbated when the tenure of senior
managers is tied into meeting specific targets.
Concern was expressed in the interviews with respect to the limited effect that the
Boards have over some of the indicators. In particular, the ability of the PAF
indicators to monitor change over time was less well supported by the respondents.
Questions were raised with respect to whether they were sensitive enough to show
changes in Board performance and policy over time. This was of particular concern
with respect to the outcome measures for equity and also local health statistics which
it was felt were not quickly amenable to interventions. It has been argued elsewhere in
the literature12 that only indicators over which the individuals have some control
should be included. However, the importance of such an argument depends on the
objective of the framework. If the aim is to stimulate discussion and a framework for
interaction between the SEHD, NHS Boards and other public sector bodies that
influence health, then the inclusion of indicators over which the NHS has little control
may not be so destructive. However, the reason for their inclusion must be made
explicit.
A further issue is the relative importance attached to the indicators and the effect that
this has on the Boards’ response to the PAF. At the moment there are no explicit
weights, which implies that they are all of equal importance. Evidence from the
interviews confirms anecdotal evidence that the Scottish Executive are perceived as
placing greater weight on waiting time and financial targets, but that the Boards and
their constituent parts may place more importance on other dimensions of
performance such as health improvement or local issues.
An important issue under Objective 1 is that of the mechanisms used to ‘encourage
sustained improvement in performance’. The use of the PAF as part of each NHS
Board’s Accountability Review gives substance to the system by integrating the
indicators into the management structure of NHS Scotland.
From the reading of policy documents, there are currently no explicit financial
incentives attached to the PAF at an organisational levelf. Similarly, from the
interview data, there are few perceived implicit or perceived financial rewards and
penalties for the NHS Boards. It was raised in the interviews that perverse incentives
may arise from the actions of helping ailing Boards with extra resources. The most
senior managers of the Boards appear to be subject to some personal rewards and
threats in the form of performance related pay, job security and labour market
positioning. These are discussed together with the effects of incentives on other
individuals under Objective 2 below.
                                                          
f This may change as noted in paragraph 20, chapter 4 of the White Paper ‘Partnership
for Care’ and the recent SEHD consultation.
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Of key importance to the Board, and thus the senior management of the Board, is the
receipt of the Accountability Review letter. The interviewees appeared to be self-
motivated to provide a good service and this letter was seen as important
acknowledgement of the level of effort exerted by the Board.
Given the mixed response in the interviews as to whether PAF changes the overall
direction of a Board, PAF may merely have a validatory role or a second
interpretation is that it acts as an anticipatory or priming tool. It may help to critically
raise awareness and promote problem sensing on a continuous basis. The first view
implies that the PAF is having limited effect on behaviour. The second implies that it
is affecting behaviour prior to the Accountability Review but perhaps with the
knowledge that the Accountability Review and thus the requirement to demonstrate
remedial actions in problem areas, lies ahead.
There appears to be some differences in the understanding of the overall objective of
the PAF and the importance of the role it plays. Some Boards seemed happy with it as
a framework for generating a dialogue at the Board Accountability Reviews and as a
representation of overall performance. Other Boards seemed more concerned with its
minutiae and whether it accurately reflects performance and the aspects of local health
that the Boards can affect.
5.2 Objective 2. ‘Reinforce and support the role of the 15 NHS Boards in
managing the performance of their local NHS systems.’
The PAF and Accountability Reviews operate at NHS Board level and performance
assessment below Board level is the responsibility of the Board. The unified NHS
Board structure has further vertically integrated the organisations within each Board
internalising the operational management role of NHS Trusts into Operating Divisions
of the Boards13. The Board has responsibility to ensure the appropriate response of
these service providers to the messages from the PAF. The effectiveness of the
mechanisms by which the Boards ensure that the service responds is key in the
successful operation of the PAF. From the interviews, a number of mechanisms were
perceived as affecting the degree to which individuals responded to the PAF. These
were (not necessarily in order of importance) self-motivation to do a good job,
acknowledgement of good performance, whether through performance related pay
(PRP) or some non-financial mechanism, the nature of the leadership of the
organisation and the management structure.
In the economics literature on incentives, financial incentives are often suggested as a
way of increasing effort: the assumption underlying such an approach is that workers
under a PRP will work harder than those on a fixed salary. Two questions are
important. Do they matter to people and do they achieve the outcomes that the
organisation wants? The interviewees’ perceptions of financial incentives linking
individual performance to the PAF depended on the Board in which they were
working. PRP was used in conjunction with management systems where individuals
are given responsibility for improvement in a group of PAF indicators. The
interviewees who were rewarded in this way seemed happy with this approach under
the proviso that their performance was placed in the local context and not crudely
linked to movements in the indicators. Such a crude system was not employed by any
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of the Boards. Indeed, the system employed appears to be a ‘subjective performance
evaluation’ approach often recommended in the literature in situations where the
range and types of tasks required of an employee are complex14.
The marginal effect, which the PRP has on the income of the individuals, is quite
small. Under such circumstances we might expect that the extra effort required of the
employee to qualify for the extra payment may be deemed not worthwhile. However,
those receiving the payments also emphasised the importance of peer respect. Thus
the payments may act as an indicator or a marker that someone is performing well.
We can deduce that, having this marker attached to a nominal PRP gives added
weight to the mechanism as it imposes a cost on assigning good performance to an
individual. Without PRP, the marker may lose its value to the recipients. However, we
have very little data on this from the interviews and whether this is the case is an
empirical question.
It is also important to understand what motivates individuals beyond the financial
incentives that they face. An important distinction often made within the economics
and psychology literature, with reference to the public sector, is that between
‘intrinsic’ and ‘extrinsic’ motivation. If individuals are motivated to employ effort to
ensure that the organisation within which they work performs well or achieves its’
objectives irrespective of any extra reward that they may receive for doing so, then
the individuals are said to be intrinsically motivated. Extrinsic motivation occurs
when an individual increases their effort to achieve organisational objectives in
response to an incentive system. It has been hypothesised that where intrinsic
motivation exists in an organisation, the introduction of incentives may act to crowd
out the intrinsic motivation15.
The respondents generally reported that they were motivated to provide a good health
service and the best use of the public spending on health care was important to them.
These findings are not surprising and in line with findings of other studies undertaken
in public health care16. Given this, it is important to ensure that staff are aware of the
value which is placed on their intrinsic motivation and that this aspect of the
motivation of the providers of the service is not damaged. Relating the literature to
these findings, it can be concluded that  any further financial incentives added to the
system should be done so with care and with attention to this hypothesis.
From the literature, the effect of the labour market and career concerns for managers
may also provide incentives to meet performance targets, as managers will be
concerned about their career prospects.17 The interviews confirm that the role of the
external labour market appears to be important in providing incentives for effort in the
light of perceived job insecurity, especially for the Chief Executive. It is important to
recognise that incentives for effort can exist in the absence of explicit pay for
performance contracts through incentives in promotions, career concerns and self-
motivation.
The data suggest that characteristics of management organisation, organisational
culture and leadership influence the effectiveness of the PAF. It is difficult to elicit
the direction of cause and precise nature of the interrelationship between these
characteristics and organisational performance. Certainly, those Boards, which have
integrated the PAF into their own management systems, seemed to feel that the PAF
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was less burdensome. However, there appears to be no single model of good practice
with respect to the internal implementation and integration of the PAF within the
NHS Boards. For instance small Boards may benefit from a close-knit management
and large Boards may benefit from a dedicated team with responsibility for individual
areas of the PAF. Although no single model dominates as superior, and different
models seem appropriate and effective in different settings, there are still
opportunities to capture and present models of good practice around Scotland and
perhaps to look wider afield at other systems. What is clear is that NHS Boards need
to view the PAF as useful for its own purposes.
One of the issues under Objective 2 is how successful the internal communication and
management of the Boards are at ensuring that the implications of the PAF are
responded to within the Boards down to provider level. This applies to providers
working within the hospital and within other health care settings such as primary care.
G.P.s deal with PAF 'issues' but may not necessarily have any direct knowledge of the
PAF itself. Although activity within G.P.s’ surgeries are clearly important to the
Primary Care sections of the PAF, they are not always explicitly aware of how the
efforts that they put into achieving improved breastfeeding rates, immunisations, and
so on affect Primary Care targets within the PAF. Moreover, one of the problems is
the system of G.P. incentives not complementing well the Board objectives. One
example given, related to the immunisation rates
Issues arise in relation to the new G.P. contract, and fears that primary care could
become less 'joined up' than before. Some interviewees expressed concern that they
would lose their voice at the Board level because of the dissolution of the Primary
Care Trusts. Although the G.P.s interviewed here clearly are aware that what they do
has an impact on both performance in the Primary Care sector and admissions into
Acute care, they noted that there was a problem of influencing strategic planning
dialogues taking place across the Boards’ services. Although G.P.s appear to have
largely escaped the level of monitoring applied to other health service providers
within the PAF, they are nevertheless subject to close scrutiny through, for instance,
peer appraisal systems and benchmarking for Quality Practice Awards. They was also
equivocacy about whether they would want to be more deeply implicated in PAF.
Another element of this internal communication is the relationship between managers
and clinicians. Although this study did not include interviews with frontline clinical
providers, it did include interviews with a small number of clinician-managers.
Relationships between managers and clinicians in this study on the whole appear to be
much more positive than anticipated given the 'traditional' tensions often described
between the two: the majority of both professional groups acknowledge the necessity
and value of working together to meet targets.
While clinicians interviewed here appear to be more open to criticising the PAF
targets than 'managers', they are also aware of the necessity of meeting targets. (See
Appendix A: 14). And while clinicians are not always as enthusiastically wedded to
the assessment culture, it is clear that any simple distinction where managers
'managed' and clinicians ignored managerial realities no longer holds true. These
clinicians appear to have been socialised in accepting some targets and measurement
of activity. Performance Assessment seems to be becoming the norm within
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organisational cultures and therefore is consistent with the activity of senior
management teams. The depth of this awareness and consciousness raising, in terms
of performance assessment, may however be restricted to an elite. One of the
challenges that faces senior managers, the SEHD and clinical managers is how to
engage broader tiers of medical staff in a dialogue that will change attitudes towards
what has been regarded as the preserve of 'managers'. While both Medical Directors
and Nursing Directors show an awareness that they must engage in management
processes if they are to have decision-making power and influence within them, this
awareness appears to be only gradually having an impact. Questions arise about how
best to diffuse this orientation and mindset so that clinicians do not feel their clinical
autonomy and judgement to be compromised or undermined by measurement diktat.
This data illustrates the complex ways in which NHS organisations are changing and
new approaches are being adopted. As part of that, performance management culture
appears to be infiltrating into the organisation of clinical care. (See Appendix A: 13c)
Perhaps new ways of engaging with clinicians and involving them in target setting,
service redesign and implementation need to be aggressively pursued.
5.3 Objective 3. ‘Enable NHS Scotland to account systematically for its
performance both locally and through the SE to the Scottish Parliament and to the
people of Scotland.’
Information on the PAF and the performance of individual NHS Boards is
indisputably available within the public domain. The quantifiable indicators are
available on the ISD web site by the Information & Statistics Division on behalf of
the Scottish Executive Health Department18. However, that has to be qualified. From
the interviews it was clear that although available, the data are is not necessarily
accessible. It is clear from the data whether a Board has improved on its previous
year’s score. On the other hand, it would take some degree of sophistication in the
reader to find out (or, indeed, to know that they need to find out) whether the
improvement is absolute, compared with other Health Boards, the Scottish average or
a target level. Furthermore, the information on the website is restricted to the
quantitative measures and excludes the qualitative assessments. These qualitative
assessments are also available on request from the SEHD but this is not stated as the
case on the web pages.
The interviewees emphasised that, given the extent to which context is deemed
necessary to interpret the data, it is questionable whether much valuable information
can be gleaned from the web pages. Having said that, the fact that it is publicly
available and allows the reader to explore and begin to ask questions is important.
However, the objective of assisting in providing public accountability at the local
level does not appear to be readily achieved by the PAF data or its presentation at the
moment. Though of course, this view was gleaned without actually asking NHS
patients or the public.
The main means by which the PAF enters the public domain at a local level is through
its integration into the local health plans and also the publication of the Accountability
Review letter by the Boards. This context allows a Board’s performance with respect
to the PAF to be described within context and the important aspects to the SE and the
Board to be highlighted. However, these two formats do not necessarily address what
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might be important to a particular individual or interest group trying to assess their
own local health care services. These issues have been raised previously with respect
to the UK and other health care systems such as that of the USA19.
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6 Policy implications
In this section, we present the authors’ interpretations of the policy implications from
the interview data in the light of our shared knowledge of managerial and economic
issues in the Scottish NHS. The overall impression from the interviews was that the
interviewees were happy to continue with the use of the PAF in Scotland. However,
as stated earlier, this opinion was given subject to a wide variety of concerns. As a
result, the policy recommendations below relate to the existing PAF and how it might
better achieve its objectives rather than any radically different policies designed to
replace the current system.
6.1 With respect to the indicators used within the PAF, refinement should
continue to be undertaken in consultation with the NHS in Scotland. The focus
should be on ways to change what is currently included in the PAF rather than
adding to its volume. This may be done by replacing some indicators for ones
that better capture the essence of an indicator or by refining existing indicators
and recognising that its not just the NHS that can influence them. Furthermore,
greater transparency and explanation is needed with respect to the rationale for
the inclusion of the indicators.
6.1 The Scottish PAF differs from other performance assessment systems (in
particular the English ‘Star’ system) in two main ways. It does not have strong
financial or non-financial incentives attached to performance and it does not
publish the data in the form of league tables. These two characteristics are
important in securing high commitment from the people we interviewed and
may be instrumental to the system’s success. Any changes away from the
current model should be undertaken with caution and the effects monitored.
6.3 We would not recommend introducing a strongly incentivised system. If
rewards are to be attached to good performance, it may be the symbolism of
the rewards and the way in which they are administered, which act as an
incentive, rather than the financial aspect per se. This is in addition to the
relationship between the PAF and the career structures of those implementing
it. Further, a note of caution is offered with respect to the perception that
‘underachieving’ Boards are ‘rewarded’ with extra resources.
6.4 It would be helpful to revisit or restate the objectives of a policy initiative in
order to ensure that it continues to be understood as it gains momentum and
maturity. This will be especially important in the context of the new unitary
Boards where the needs of primary care must be balanced with acute services
and the relevance and implementation of PAF will apply to all.
6.5 Although no single model dominates as superior, and different models seem
appropriate and effective in different settings, opportunities to capture and
present models of good practice around Scotland and perhaps to look wider
afield at other systems should be sought. In particular more needs to be
understood about the importance of local management and leadership in the
implementation process.
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6.6 One of the big challenges that PAF faces is how to honour its objective to
deliver local accountability. The Accountability Review letter is the main
medium thorough which the public is informed. However, this is only a small
aspect of the PAF. It may be worth considering whether the objective of PAF
to increase local accountability is a laudable one and one which should be
pursued. There may be alternative means of achieving this end, which would
be more appropriate. To achieve it would require considerable work on the
presentation of the PAF on the ISD web pages17 and integration of these with
the individual NHS Board websites. If this route is taken it may be fruitful to
examine the approaches taken by other parts of the public sector.
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7 Future research agenda
The limits of this study as already outlined above are governed by the time-scale in
which it has been undertaken and while it answers a number of interesting questions it
raises many new and related questions. Some of these have been formulated above
and are reiterated briefly below. Some are very closely related to the study described
in this report and would build on the analysis using the existing data set. Other areas
of suggested future research are quite distinct from the questions and methods used
here. Specific references within these proposals are not made to the English and other
similar performance assessment systems. However, there are opportunities for
illuminating and improving the Scottish system through comparison with and learning
from other comparable systems.
7.1 Further investigation of this study’s data set coupled with additional
qualitative data would address the interesting issue of the differences in the
perception of PAF between the different user groups, from the Scottish
Executive to the frontline NHS staff and the public or consumer of health care.
7.2 This study has been able to draw out initial observations on the style of the
implementation and integration of the PAF by the NHS Boards. Further
analysis would enable the different models of good practice to be identified
and disseminated. Such a study may benefit from examining a wider
experience than that of Scotland.
7.3 Related to the above is the question of what is required to change  a  NHS
Board which is perceived as being less successful into one which is perceived
as a ‘good performing  NHS Board. For example, is it new leadership, a new
management team, an increase in resources, training or something else?
7.4 Are there discrepancies between how Boards are perceived to be performing
and how they are actually performing? Are the less successful Boards
identified as such by performance on indicators or is it a matter of presentation
by the organisations in question? Or conversely are the successful NHS
Boards those which present themselves positively and ‘play the game’ and/or
those which perform best on the performance indicators? Much more needs to
be known about organisational culture and management and how these aspects
link to performance
7.5 A question raised within the interview schedule was the perception of the
influence that the NHS organisations have over the performance indicators.
The question of attribution and influence could be addressed by more rigorous
analysis examining evidence of a causal relationship between Board activity,
other exogenous characteristics (such as local socio-economic factors) and
Board performance. A systematic programme of analysis could address
specific areas of concern for the NHS Boards and the SEHD.
7.6 There is scope to research whether PAF and similar methodologies create
dysfunctional behaviour and perverse incentives that may lead to different
outcomes to those intended by the policy makers?
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7.7 As a longer series of data becomes available on the PAF, opportunities to
answer questions using quantitative techniques with respect to its impact on
NHS performance will become possible and will be crucial in analysing the
effects of the policy.
7.8 Interviewees within this study suggested that relative performance in the PAF
might affect an individual’s future positioning in the job market and job
mobility. Further investigation of the link between labour markets and the
performance of NHS Boards would present a clearer picture of the implicit
incentives in the NHS and help inform the need for future explicit incentives
within the system. Comparisons between different professional groups (for
example, hospital doctors and managers) might help inform the differences in
importance attached to the PAF by different professional groups.
7.9 Further research is recommended on the extent to which the PAF is meeting
its objective to ‘increase local accountability’ of the NHS. This would require
investigation involving members of the public and local advocates for
healthcare. A far-reaching study would question the feasibility of the objective
and possible alternative ways of addressing this objective.
7.10 A key aspect of the perception of the PAF is the quality of the data collection
and the methods of collection. Further work in this area to ensure consistency
and quality between Boards would increase the credibility of the system. It
will also be valuable to collect data over time and to assess how the new
Board restructuring process impacts on PAF.
39
8. Acknowledgements
We are grateful to the NHS Scotland staff who gave generously of their time and
hospitality in the completion of the interviews used to collect data for this report. The
Health Economics Research Unit receives core support from the Chief Scientist of the
Scottish Executive Health Department. We are pleased to have had the opportunity to
work collaboratively across the College of Arts and Social Sciences and the Institute
of Applied Health Sciences. The views in this report are those of the authors and not
their funding bodies.
40
References
                                                          
1 Scottish Executive Health Department. Our National Health. A plan for action, a
plan for change. December 2000.
2 Scottish Executive Health Department. Rebuilding our National Health Service.
May 2001.
3 New performance assessment and accountability review arrangements for
NHSScotland
4 Scottish Executive Health Department Human Resources Directorate. Appraisal
arrangements for staff on executive pay ranges. HDL(2002)664, 23 August 2002.
5 Scott A and Farrar S. Incentives in Health Care. In: Advances in Health Care. Edited
by A Scott, A Maynard and R Elliot. Wiley, Chichester, 2003.
6 Scottish Executive Health Department. A framework for reform: devolved decision-
making. Moving towards single-system working. HDL(2003)11, 7 March 2003.
7 Herbert DT and Thomas CJ. School Performance, league tables and social
geography. Applied Geography, 18, 3, 199-223, 1998.
8 Audit Commission. The Comprehensive Performance Assessment Framework for
Single Tier and County Councils, London, 2002.
9 Walsh K. The rise of regulation in the NHS. British Medical Journal, 324, 967-970,
April 2002.
10 Nutley S and Smith PC. League tables for performance improvement in health care.
Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, 3, 1, 50-57, 1998.
11 Scottish Executive Health Department. Performance Assessment Framework. NHS
HDL (2002)78, 1 November, 2002.
12 Guiffrida A, Gravelle H and Roland M. Measuring quality of care with routine data:
avoiding confusion between performance indicators and health outcomes. British
Medical Journal, 319, 94-98, 10 July, 1999.
13 Scottish Executive Health Department. A framework for reform: devolved decision-
making. Moving towards single-system working. HDL(2003)11, 7 March 2003.
14 Burgess S and Metcalfe P. Incentives in organisations: a selective overview of the
literature with application to the public sector. Working Paper 99/016. Centre for
Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, 1999.
15 Frey BS. Not Just for the Money. An economic theory of personal motivation.
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK, 1997.
16 Le Grand J Knights, knaves and pawns: health behaviour and social policy. Journal
of Social Policy, 26, 149-170, 1997.
17 Scott A and Farrar S. Incentives in Health Care. In: Advances in Health Care.
Edited by A Scott, A Maynard and R Elliot. Wiley, Chichester, 2003.
18 http://www.paf.scot.nhs.uk/paf/index.html at 22 December 2003.
19 Davies HTO and Marshall MN. Public disclosure of performance data: does the
public get what the public wants? Lancet, 353, 1639-1640, May 15, 1999.
41
Appendix A: Illustrative Quotes
1. Trust, monitoring and the quality of care issues not captured by existing monitoring
systems:
'So that’s why I say I understand the principle of it - and if I was sitting at the centre
and had to have some way of knowing the service other than getting better at hearing
the reality of what local people within the service know... For instance if you go into a
local service and you talk to local consultants then they’ll tell you which clinician is
… you know who they’d refer their own mother to amongst the geriatricians and those
sorts of things… And you can only grab that [type of information] by active
management I think. So if you're sitting far enough away from the local service and
you want to measure stuff and you want to be able to ask a set of questions and get
some sense of whether local management capacity can deal with the problems I
accept that something like the PAF or the process around the PAF is a way of doing
that. But we’re still at the stage of having very imperfect indicators I’m afraid'
(Interview 32, NHS Board member).
2. Monitoring and replication of data collection
'…sometimes you do feel as if hang on a minute we need to start from scratch, what
are we going to be measured on and how can we have a more streamlined approach
to it?  I mean there was one week at the beginning of this year, tail end of last, where
we had CNORIS in measuring us on a whole…particularly looking at risk and…but
its got people issues in it, its got quality issues in it, its got service issues in it, we have
the clinical standards board which was one of the bits of QIS which is now in there
visiting that same week, we had…[…] …so the establishment of QIS has brought
together a number of strands that were previously monitored separately so that is an
improvement. But I think we have still got a way to go to kind of make sure that we
aren’t duplicating because people are busy enough and I think we need to get that
right.  I don’t know if we have got that right yet' (Interview 11).
3. Health improvement and the problems of capturing this in the PAF (Interview 33,
NHS Board Chief Executive)
'Actually, if we are just looking at hitting targets, it doesn’t reflect areas where,
especially in health improvement, the energy is required, the creativity. I think
particularly in health improvement because it is very long term … long period and
therefore long term benefits before you can realise it… Because in spite of your
efforts you cannot force the community to do certain things, they are actually out with
your direct control. So, I think there is a real dichotomy and dilemma between a lot of
the targets that are set and the indicators and the reality. I think we may well have to
use some softer measures in parallel to show […] the creativity and the energy and
the sheer effort that has been put in, as opposed to just the out put. I think that would
be very helpful.’
Interviewer: Do you have any thoughts on how that could be captured?
‘I think first of all, I know it is laborious, but to have some way for us to be very clear
what are the activities and the intentions and those local targets…  at least if the
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department sees those details maybe it would give them a flavour. And not assuming
no I’ve hit the target, but it’s actually … it’s still commendable what you have been
doing. I think the other thing is it doesn’t quite link up. Our current culture is to work
in partnership with particular local authorities in health improvement, and again how
do you capture what they are doing through the community plan?  Because if they are
also a health improvement organisation we are only capturing one, and maybe if we
begin to join the two up together to reflect the joint effort as well as the joint
responsibility we might have something that is much more meaningful in health
improvement.’
4. Human Resources Issues
‘Yes, if you look at the areas around, primarily I guess, either organisational
performance in relation to finance or organisational performance in relation to
waiting times and all that kind of stuff  there is enormous amount of effort put into
that. That backs up the view, that I think most Trusts have, which are probably three,
real key objectives in the NHS in Scotland. One is that you have to work within your
financial constraints, and you have meet your financial targets. The second is that you
have to have your priorities around waiting times, and third is that you have to get it
through the winter. If you do those three things then you’ve been pretty successful…
Chief executives don’t believe they are going to get sacked because they don’t answer
the question in the PAF field around the extent of which they met the leadership
challenge on the back of race equality, but they do think that if they don’t balance the
books or they don’t have a winter time target than they are in a valuable position.’
So, do you think that the staff governance areas should be more developed?
‘Yes, absolutely. I think it needs to be more developed, and I think it needs to be given
a higher level [of priority]... where the PAF, I think, really adds value to the system
as a back up to the accountability review process. The extent of which it penetrates
the Trust mechanism through Scotland, I think is quite limited. Because it is used to
back up the accountability review process, it tends to be seen as a whole systems issue
and therefore it’s a matter more ... for Health Boards than for Trusts.’
Okay, so when you say whole systems you mean the NHS level rather than whole
system as in the unified board?
‘No, I think what I am meaning is that if there is a health economy, which in our case
is [area H], within our Trusts and a Health Board, then the issues around the PAF
really are primarily for Health Board and not for the Trusts, and only impinge on the
Trusts to that extent that Chief Executives of the Trusts are in the room with the Chief
Executives of the Health Board when the Scottish Executive are coming out to have
the conversations around the Accountability Review. That’s where it starts to have
some impetus I suspect.
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5. Problems with data quality
'The way numbers are collated and…most of the PAF comes from SMRs […] ISD
information services, and that mostly comes from trusts and systems through what is
called SMR data, its basically…we record our activity in a certain way around things
like out patients, day cases and in patients. That is (a) I would suggest that we are not
all recording that data in a consistent way and (b) we certainly don’t…the system
certainly doesn’t describe the complexity of what we do. If you are involved at the
local level in things like benchmarking (if I use that as an example, because the same
data is kind of chopped down and used in lots of different ways.), you end up having
lots of arguments with clinicians about whether the data is valid or not. So I think, if
we are going to make this work, we have got to … improve the quality of the data that
we [collect] and then … you wouldn’t have arguments about consistency. I mean the
thing is national pictures are really difficult because … we haven’t got consistent
ways of describing some things that happen, we haven’t got consistent ways of
delivering things' (Interview 24, NHS Trust Chief Executive).
6. Primary care indicators
'No I think they [PAF indicators] … well they seem to be more orientated towards
Acute Trusts and I think that is just the nature of the beast. I think it’s
easier…because of the nature of the activity that occurs in the Acute Trusts where
people are kind of in and out and through the door, then you are looking at activity
which can be measured. Its much more difficult in the Primary Care sector, even
where they are bed-based, because they are not based on specific interventions. Its
much more difficult to produce comparative information and a lot of the work that
takes place in the Primary Care Trusts which is around influencing and corralling
and bringing about change in a very different kind of way to saying this is the target
that we have got to achieve and this is…and how are we going to achieve it?  It’s
much more difficult to do that in a Primary Care setting.’
Can you give me an example of one of these things?
‘Well if you just take a kind of bed comparison for a start, then if you take acute beds
in mental health as opposed to acute beds in general medicine or in surgical beds or
whatever. You would say that someone going through a surgical intervention or a hip
replacement, then the operation should take roughly X number of hours, I suppose
there is a minimum and a maximum that they are likely to take and that the average
length of stay is Y. If someone has an acute mental illness than its quite…you cannot
say that the average length of stay for someone who has got manic depression will be
X and the average length of stay for someone with schizophrenia will be Y because
there are far more other factors that play into it and you have not got…you would
have a drug regime or a […] therapy regime or whatever that you are going to use
with the individual. Its not as simple as saying a broken hip, we will mend it, get the
person back on their feet and out the door… But things like waiting lists yes you can
say um…that there can be comparatives between waiting lists for acute care and
waiting lists you know for paediatric, occupational therapy, or waiting lists for
psychology or whatever, you can take raw data like that and make comparisons.  But
I think with beds … that is not an easy one. Equally can you say to a general
practitioner I expect you to see X number of patients in X number of hours. Now the
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GP contract, the new GMS contract has all the quality indicators, but they are not
about activity, they are about the outcomes from patient care or patient
interventions’. (Interview 18, NHS Trust Chief Executive).
7. Relative importance of the indicators
'The health improvement ones are important, but I do think we need to refine them
further to be useful. I think the more crucial one is actually clinical governance,
which is not featured as part of the PAF. We have other ways of vetting it, which
comes through Quality Improvement Scotland, and old clinical standards, but I really
think if we are into performance management there needs to be a single system to
cover it all, because its all very well to say well are you able to hit the waiting time,
well fine but what if you end up with very high morbidity rates as a consequence, and
errors, and high suing rates. So, I don’t think of the PAF in terms of performance, it’s
performance of outputs, but not of the quality of the service. As a patient I would be
much more concerned when having my knee operation done that it’s been done
properly, I have been discharged appropriately, I’ve got the right drugs, so that the
whole patient protection journey is there. The second area is missing – so I’m giving
you more of the opposite end of the spectrum—its really some aspects of public
protection which is about emergency planning and business continuity, there is no
performance management of that side, it comes under more –I don’t know if you are
familiar with—CNORIS, which is the risk management system we all had previously
to go through. So, in terms of performance management I would welcome a very clear
system, encompassing all the streams that are crucial, so business continuity, clinical
effectiveness and clinical governance, those are two not featured currently in the
PAF. (Interview 33, NHS Board Chief Executive).
8. Supporting and encouraging improved performance
a) Negative response:
'No not at all. Because there is no reward for good performance, apart from the
accountability review where you are commended for it, but there is no other tangible
incentive. For staff in the front line, they are working under a lot or pressure hitting
these targets, but they are not getting the funding, because the funding does not
reward good people. The current funding  . . . we try very hard every year in [Board
B] to break even financially and that’s the pain and needing to do a lot of things.
Reward is given to the people who over spend; they get ‘bail-out’ money. There is
totally, absolutely zero incentive for doing well…' (Interview 33, NHS Board Chief
Executive).
b) Positive response:
Yes it does. It sharpens up…if you talk to some of our directors here, they will home
in on what they see as key gaps or problems in services. What PAF does is it
measures it for you much more accurately and puts it into perspective along with
other indicators and that is vitally important, because given the range of things we
cover in the NHS as you know, and given the professional and public and political
priorities that folk have, the thing about PAF when you look at all the indicators, it
really gives you a…not a league table but it reorders your priorities more accurately.
And for example, if you took the one I mentioned about X [interviewee names an area
of the service], normally […] health improvement is raised as a big issue that will
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come at the board and the board say fine, compared to hip operations or knees or
delayed discharges, that has slipped down the priority list. You see it in PAF it
doesn’t, it is a major implication, so I think that is what PAF does, I don’t think it
identifies anything unknown but I think it measures it and puts it in the proper
balance along with other indicators, I think that is the value of PAF. I would be very
concerned if PAF came up with something that our directors here had not
highlighted. But it definitely on the national basis sharpens it. I welcome PAF; I do
think it is a good development' (Interview 13, NHS Board member).
Accountability Review
'Yes, the reviews have become much more constructive and much more of a dialogue.
I think the view Trevor Jones has taken, and I applaud him for this, is around
openness and transparency. So that the Board and the Health Department coming to
the Accountability Review have got an agreed pack of data, there have been lots of
discussions going on between my staff and officials within the health dept about what
are the key issues. So we’ll all know what the issues are. So we can come to the table
and have an open and honest dialogue. I think that has enormously helped. The
Health Department know we’re not going to spring surprises on them at the
Accountability Review and we’ve built up a trust with the Health Department t that
they’re not going to do the same with us. I think that’s hugely beneficial' (Interview
28, NHS Board Chief Executive).
9. Trust and monitoring
'I’m torn because the burden of doing more and more of this takes away from the
getting on and managing the problems in the service which is why I quite overall like
more freedom to be getting on and managing the problems in the service but I
understand that if I was at the centre I would be nervous about that as an approach.
You have to have confidence in management capacity to be able to allow that
freedom' (Interview 32, NHS Board member).
'If you could cut down on the inspections for say the next year, […] instead of coming
annually we won’t go for two years or three years. Because in a small board we
spend so much time digging out information and being inspected. I’m using inspection
but I suppose monitoring is the right word but that does take up a lot of time and that
takes time away from managers who could be doing something more useful'
(Interview 19).
10. Rewards and penalties
a) 'I think people generally want to do a good job, and if you give them the resource
and the commitment to do that and support them, then they will do that. The pay is
nice to have on top of that, but I don’t think it’s the main driver, because the amounts
of money are not so significant that they are going to dramatically change people’s
sense of whether they want to get up, you know. So, I think it’s on the march, but it’s
one factor that will help, but I don’t think we have the same level of incentives that
are in other sectors if you were a real high performer in the organisation. I think
there’s an issue there about career developments things as well that you do want to
have as talent, and perhaps use that and develop people in their careers and give
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them more rewarding fulfilling careers that maybe we haven’t quite got to yet in the
NHS' (Interview 41).
b) 'No notice required and no compensation given. Similarly, should the minister wish
to dispense of your services … no notice will be given and no compensation will be
paid. So we work on that kind of basis and I think that is the right way in a public
appointment, because the sort of power we wield…not power, responsibility we carry
and what we carry with it …. If you start going a bit off beam or off target, what is it
they say nowadays off message, then the public interest of public safety and the public
purse I think you have to go smartish.' (Interview 13, NHS Board member).
11. Job security
a) '…for the chief executive you would need to accept that’s part of the risk and I’m
not moaning about that. I’m really saying that, well I had a good track record I
believe in my last job. Suppose I don’t do well in this job, another organisation would
say, “Well we’ve over-promoted him or we’ve put him in the wrong job, we’ll pull
him quietly and put him there”. What happens in the health service is you get sacked.
You get all over the press. You get people making statements about failure and then
sometimes they try and help you behind the scene and come in somewhere else but
that’s a traumatic process to go through so I think there’s a real issue there about
how that’s dealt with.' (Interview 5, NHS Board Chief Executive).
b) 'Well these are potentially high risk jobs, you know. Because you are the
accountable officer and, if you are in an organisation, this organisation runs a budget
of [figure] million, we employ [X thousand] people. The potential for things to go
wrong is extremely high, you know, because a lot of things within NHS Board area
are largely outwith the direct control of the Chief Executive. It depends on how
clinicians treat patients or… whatever happens to be. But what we have to try and do
is to ensure the governance of that and systems are in place or people are in place to
conduct the work in a satisfactory manner. So it is difficult to keep on top of
everything. Part of it is putting the right systems in place and having the right people
but part of it is about luck as well. […]Yes, it is perhaps not as bad as I have made it
out to be but there are certainly in my experience quite a number of people that have
fallen on their swords.' (Interview 10, NHS Board Chief Executive).
c) '[T]here are [number of employees] in the NHS in [area] and at any given moment
any one of them might be doing something that will get them sacked or if you’re doing
something so gross that the Health and Safety Executive will prosecute or something,
there’s nothing I can do about it'. (Interview 6, NHS Board Chief Executive).
12 Implementing the PAF
a) 'The other way, in terms of promoting a very integrated culture, we concentrate on
the culture rather than structural change by having Chief Executive portfolios. So,
myself and the Trust Chief Executives each have a raft of portfolios where we have
Chief Executive leadership and these would be in areas where we don’t have a
personal responsibility. So, for example, I am leading on X [interviewee names an
area of service], which is a strictly a primary care trust responsibility, but that
leadership means that I am driving the completion of the joint strategy with the local
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authorities. I am actually leading the implementation group and if things go wrong in
the process I have to make sure the trouble shooting happens. So I am not going to the
line managers saying why are you doing this wrong, because that’s the job of the
primary care Chief Executive. But I still need to make sure the dialogue is taking
place and if it’s something between the primary and acute trust, I need to make sure
the parties have had the dialogue and resolved it. Similarly, we have the primary care
Chief Executive actually leading on the X [names another area of the service], whilst
he doesn’t manage those functions. So, this very kind of cross system leadership is a
way to promote a very corporate integrated culture. That’s the way the leadership
style is moving in that integrated, team working, corporativeness, open and hopefully
trusting relationship.’ (Interview 33, NHS Board Chief Executive)
b) 'I think we’ve got a really good team, a culture where devolving responsibility, a
team that’s supportive. We’re not going to hang people out to dry, we’re not going to
go after people as individuals when things go wrong. We seek to support individuals
and the whole concept of having teams, being the senior management team or service
teams, and we’ll work with them, we’ll manage them rigorously but we’ll support
them. Really PAF is one important factor in a whole range of things that people in the
service need to deliver upon. There’s a whole range of really important areas that
aren’t covered in any detail by the PAF that actually are probably more important to
get right. So you take for example child protection. Major issue for the First Minister.
[…] It is of absolute importance that health and the council and all the agencies are
working together to get child protection right. So in terms of the list of things that I
think are absolute imperatives, must do, that’s pretty high on my list. That does not
feature in any way here, so PAF is important but it needs to be put into context'
(Interview 28, NHS Board Chief Executive).
c) 'Yeah [the PAF is integrated into our management system], this is a paper you
might want to take away and have a look at. This shows how we’re using performance
information in [area]. So we’ve got the Director of Public Health’s Annual Report, the
PAF output, last year’s performance, i.e. the things we had in the health plan and
whether we did or didn’t do them, and national requirements … What we’ve done is
use all that to inform the health plan, to then inform the objectives for the different
parts of the system. And then we use that to system performance manage and the
linked individual’s objectives. This describes here how we on a monthly basis take
information back to the Board, the more detailed work the executives use, how we’ve
fed the health plan into that, how we’re doing on performance assessments measures.
And it gives the reports we’re using and how we’re using them. So on the PAF for
example, what we’ve done is we take each of the indicators and give ourselves a
reading based on what it says. We don’t alter what it says. So if we’re in the upper bit
we have a star and if we’ve got a problem we’ve got one of these marks to make you
realise there’s a problem. Then we chart the train so as it’s steady, up, down, or what.
So then after discussion we decide whether we think we need to be doing something
about that, we define it as high, low or medium. And then we factor that into what’s
going into our health plan and what we’re trying to do. So we’re trying to use it to
kind of be more informative and mean something.' (Interview 29, NHS Board Chief
Executive).
d) 'I think it’s an essential building block in the Board’s evolution in its Health Plan
and its longer term aims for [Board area] and its longer term budget and planning.
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It’s … part of the fabric of our decision-making process' (Interview 30, NHS
member).
13. G.P.s and the PAF
a) 'Well I know very little about PAF, in my view most GPs don’t know anything about
it at all; they don’t even know it exists. Um….I only know about it because I used to
work as a part-time [role] and some aspects of coronary heart disease were
interesting me at that time and I was made aware that there were some items within
the PAF that were linked to coronary heart disease so I had a look at it on that basis,
but it was pretty impenetrable.’ (Interview 27, G.P.).
b) 'One thing that I think is terrible is that there should be any connection between
how much a G.P. is paid and whether a child is immunised and so I don’t think there
should be any targets at all and I don’t think there should be any financial pressure
put upon G.P.s to immunise more children than their parents are comfortable in
doing.' (Interview 27, G.P.).
14. Clinicians and managers
a) 'I have never bothered in the slightest with the PAF—that’s something Chief
Executives tend to get cheered and excited about; they’re the only people who go and
get praised, and quite frankly if you asked me what the leading areas in the PAF
were, I wouldn’t have a clue,  and I wouldn’t have a clue what the Health Board or
the Trust against these actually is. The truth is, I’m probably involved in delivering a
lot of these, but I don’t bother with the PAF… I look at my own personal objectives
and I look at objectives effectively set for me within the individual areas I am
responsible for.' (Interview 43).
b) 'As a doctor you never have any objectives, if you want a change you consult a
contract. You don’t have objectives you just do the job. If you have a waiting list then
you just have to make sure you keep it under control and even if that consultant fails
to do that he doesn’t get any penalties, it’s the chief executive that gets the penalties.
You come from an atmosphere where objective setting is totally strange, you deliver
good clinical, as best you can, and your real target is just to make sure patients are
safe. When you come into management, you receive a series of objectives and I have
to say I initially I was very, very cynical. I couldn’t even write a set of objectives when
asked to. Now I can, and I pay a lot more attention to whether I am writing
achievable objectives for myself, and a lot more attention to the discussion I have with
my chief executive about whether they are achievable and a lot more attention . . .
initially as Medical Director before we got things organised you kind of … picked
things up as you went along. You know you didn’t have something you could strictly
say was your responsibility. You might feel that if Doctors were heavily involved in it,
then you kind of picked up. That has changed radically over a few years, down there
are specific areas that you are responsible for and I feel a personal responsibility. If I
failed in them, I would feel a real sense of failure, I might even pack in the job if I
failed them. … I take on specific things and I know they are my responsibilities as
Executive Director and I have to achieve the goals associated with these. ' (Interview
43).
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15. Local accountability
'So I think one of our criticisms of the PAF would be it’s not terribly user friendly. It’s
really difficult for even NHS non-executive directors to get their heads around the
various technical aspects of it. And the requirement to publish the PAF indicators in
the annual report. Actually publishing it in a way that someone living in [town] or
[town] would be able to actually understand what this means….' (Interview 28, NHS
Board Chief Executive).
50
Appendix B: Schedule used for the NHS Board interviews
Personal details
Name:
Current post:
Time in post:
Previous post:
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 A current trend in the public sector is to systematically assess performance of
organisations. What do you think of the usefulness of this approach in general?
[Big general/ideological question to help place the other responses in context].
1.2. What do you think of the PAF compared to earlier attempts at managing
performance in the NHS?
• Purchaser-provider split
• The previous AR process
• Resource Management Initiative
• CRAG (clinical outcome indicators), etc?
1.3 What do you think of the Scottish PAF compared to other systems, for example
the English star system?
2. SENSITIVITY AND SCOPE OF THE INDICATORS
2.1 Do the performance indicators adequately represent your Board’s performance?
Are they a useful way of measuring performance?
• Appropriate/inappropriate
• Performance over time
• Change/improvement not covered by indicators?
2.2 As you probably know the PAF data is collected at the NHS Board level. Do you
think this is the right level at which to collect data and implement the PAF?
• Trust level? - this what they do in England
2.3 What affects whether you can progress towards meeting the targets in the PAF?
• resources
• factors beyond the board’s influence [socio-economic, etc]
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• other organisation
• too many targets
• variation within the Board?
2.4 How would you describe your NHS Board in terms of location and socio-
economic factors?
• urban/rural/remote
• poor
• mixed
• small/large
[prompt them re why they were chosen for close examination – is this how they see
themselves?]
2.5 How would you describe your NHS Board in terms of the management leadership
style (across your senior team)?
• how does this affect the implementation of the PAF?
• how does the PAF affect the style?
2.7 What are the relationships like between the managers and the clinicians in your
Board?
• are they affected by the PAF?
• do these affect the implementation of the PAF / hinder of help?
3. RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDICATORS
3.1 Which do you see as the most important indicators - from your Board’s
perspective/from the Scottish Executive’s perspective?
• Is there a difference between the two? Why? Does this have any affect on the way
that you respond to the PAF, to your Board?
• If they are the same, why?
- agreement
- responding to incentives in the system
- complying for other reasons
4. INCENTIVES AND THE ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW
4.1 One of the objectives of the PAF is to support and encourage improved
performance. Does your experience of the PAF support this?
4.2 Were you involved in Accountability Reviews prior to the integration of the PAF?
Has the integration of the PAF into the Reviews changed the nature of them?
4.3 What lessons (if any) came out of your accountability review and will this affect
your activity in the coming year?
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• are there changes in priority/focus
• Examples
4.4 How will you take these changes forward?
4.5 What effect (if any) is that likely to have on the rest of the service?
4.6 Is this what you as a Board would have chosen to focus on if it were not for the
PAF and/or your accountability review?
• Did the accountability review change your direction or complement what
you were doing anyway?
4.8 I’d like you to think about possible rewards and penalties associated with
performing well or poorly on the PAF. Does the NHS Board experience any such
penalties or rewards?
• Financial incentives/budgetary changes
• Non-financial incentives
• Explicit/implicit
• How do they work?
• How are they intended to work?
• Examples
• Opportunities/restrictions
4.9 What about for you as an individual? Are there rewards and penalties in the
system for you which are affected by how well the board performs with respect to
PAF?
• Financial incentives
• Non-financial incentives (e.g. promotion)
• Explicit/implicit
• How do they work?
• How are they intended to work?
• Examples
4.10 Are there any rewards or penalties associated with the PAF for other individuals
within the Board or the Trusts?
• Financial incentives
• Non-financial incentives (e.g. promotion)
• Explicit/implicit
• How do they work?
• How are they intended to work?
• Examples
5. IMPLEMENTING THE PAF
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5.1 How much input/guidance have you as a Trust been offered to help you to
understand and implement the PAF?
• Where from (Scottish Executive, other Trusts, your NHS Board, peers)?
• Useful?
• What else could have been done to help?
5.2 The Scottish Executive carried out a consultation process on the PAF in 2001 and
2002.
• Did you take part?
• Did they seem to listen to you?
• Was this useful?
5.3 What steps has your NHS Board taken to implement the PAF? Plans for the
future?
5.4 How does your Board intend to use the PAF?
• As a set of incentives
• As a set of instructions
• As a set of constraints/targets
• As a management tool which can be used internally within the Board?
5.5 Does the PAF influence decision-making within the Board? On a regular (weekly
or monthly) basis?
5.6 How wide is the PAF’s influence within the Board? Has it influenced its
relationship with your Trusts or hospitals?
• How far does the PAF filter down and how does it do this?
• What mechanisms does the Board have available to it to ensure that it and its
Trusts perform on the PAF, does it use them?
5.7 How much time is committed to addressing the PAF?
LOCAL AND NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
6.1 One of the objectives of the PAF is to enable the NHS to be accountable to local
people and to the Scottish Parliament. Do you think that it assists this aim and how
does this accountability work for your Board?
54
FINALLY
7.1 Looking back at your achievements over the past year, can you tell me about one
thing that you do well in this NHS board that other Boards could learn from?
7.2 Are there any aspects which you feel that we haven’t covered? Any other
comments which you would like to make about the PAF and the accountability review
process?
7.3 Finally, how have you found taking part in this interview?
END
